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Articles 
DISCOVERING A BETTER WAY: THE NEED 
FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIL LITIGATION REFORM 
JOHN H. BEISNER† 
[T]he American civil justice system is indeed different, and the idea 
of discovery is a fairly novel one. [Discovery] came . . . with the 1938 
experiment in revising the rules of [civil] procedure. It was an 
experiment when the civil rules were adopted[,] . . . which still hasn’t 
been revisited. 
 – Judge Paul Niemeyer1 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article addresses the myriad problems posed by unfettered 
discovery in the United States. Rather than promoting fairness and 
efficiency in the American legal system, plaintiffs today often use 
discovery in an abusive and vexatious manner to coerce defendants 
into accepting quick settlements. Over the past several decades, 
discovery has expanded in both scope and magnitude such that 
discovery costs now account for at least half of the total litigation costs 
in any given case. The advent of electronic discovery has only 
exacerbated the problem, given the sheer number of electronic 
documents generated in the course of business and the corresponding 
time, effort, and cost associated with electronic discovery. Although 
recent efforts to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
failed to combat the abuses of civil discovery, meaningful and 
effective reform of the current system is possible. This Article 
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 1. Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Comments at the Roscoe Pound Institute 1999 Forum for State Court Judges (July 14, 1999), in 
ROSCOE POUND INST., CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING DISCOVERY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE 
COURTS: REPORT OF THE 1999 FORUM FOR STATE COURT JUDGES 33, 33 (1999), available at 
http://www.poundinstitute.org/images/1999ForumReport.pdf. 
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proposes a number of pragmatic reforms—including adopting the 
English rule for discovery disputes and suspending discovery during 
the pendency of a motion to dismiss—to mitigate the abusive and 
costly nature of discovery in the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception in 1938, pretrial discovery has been one of the 
most divisive and nettlesome issues in civil litigation in the United 
States. Discovery was designed to prevent trials by ambush and to 
ensure just adjudications.2 But it has fallen well short of these 
laudable goals. Instead, the pretrial discovery process is broadly 
viewed as dysfunctional, with litigants utilizing discovery excessively 
and abusively.3 Plaintiffs’ attorneys routinely burden defendants with 
costly discovery requests and engage in open-ended “fishing 
expeditions” in the hope of coercing a quick settlement. As a result, 
discovery frequently becomes the focus of litigation, rather than a 
mere step in the adjudication process.4 By some estimates, discovery 
costs now comprise between 50 and 90 percent of the total litigation 
costs in a case.5 Discovery abuse also represents one of the principal 
causes of delay and congestion in the judicial system.6 These problems 
 
 2. Drafters of the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure believed that the discovery 
process would not only encourage parties to settle but also help litigants reach a just outcome by 
making all relevant evidence available to both sides. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary 
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique of Proposals for Change, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1301–
03 (1978) (noting that the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intended the rules to 
increase disclosure of information, thereby reducing the adversarial nature of trial preparation); 
William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 701, 703 (1989) (asserting that the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
aimed to encourage settlements and the just resolution of disputes by creating a “procedural 
framework . . . free of surprise and technical encumbrance”). 
 3. Griffin D. Bell, Chilton Davis Varner & Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure in 
Discovery—The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (“Scholars, litigators, judges, and, 
more recently, even politicians have joined in unusual consensus to urge that reform of the 
discovery process is needed.”). 
 4. Id. at 11 (“[Discovery] has become the focal point of litigation instead of a means to an 
end.”). 
 5. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that “discovery cost 
accounts for roughly 80 percent of total litigation costs in securities fraud cases”); Thomas E. 
Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery 
and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 547–48 
& tbl.4 (1997) (“Among attorneys reporting discovery expenses, the proportion of litigation 
expenses attributable to discovery is typically fairly close to 50 [percent] . . . . Half estimated 
that discovery accounted for 25 [percent] to 70 [percent] of litigation expenses.”); Judicial 
Conference Adopts Rules Changes, Confronts Projected Budget Shortfalls, THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 
1999, at 2–3 (“Discovery represents 50 percent of the litigation costs in the average case and up 
to 90 percent of the litigation costs in cases in which it is actively used.”). 
 6. Louis Harris & Assocs., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and 
Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 731, 733 (1989) (polling two hundred federal and eight hundred state judges, and finding 
that many judges believed that discovery abuse “is the most important cause of delays in 
litigation and of excessive costs”). 
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have led to perennial calls for discovery reform7 and have resulted in 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) 
in 1980, 1983, 1993, 2000, and 2006.8 Anxiety over abusive discovery 
practices has also led many federal and state courts to experiment 
with local reforms, but such efforts have been largely unsuccessful. 
The exponential growth in the volume of electronic documents 
created by modern computer systems has exacerbated the problem of 
abusive discovery and is jeopardizing the legal system’s ability to 
handle even routine matters.9 One recent case, for example, involved 
production of a volume of electronic documents equivalent to a stack 
of paper “137 miles high.”10 But the problem is not simply one of 
scope. Discovery of computer-based information costs more, 
consumes more time, and “creates more headaches” than 
conventional, paper-based discovery.11 Indeed, the effort and expense 
associated with electronic discovery are so excessive that, regardless 
of a case’s merits, settlement is often the most fiscally prudent course. 
The foregoing assertions cannot be dismissed as hyperbole. A 
recent joint survey of trial lawyers conducted by the American 
College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for the Advancement of 
the American Legal System unambiguously concluded that “our 
 
 7. The growing call for discovery reform was addressed at the 1976 Pound Conference, 
convened at the request of Chief Justice Burger to assess growing problems in litigation. The 
Conference’s final report observed that “[w]ild fishing expeditions . . . seem to be the norm,” 
and lamented the “[u]nnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high costs to the 
litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as a lever toward settlement” 
that had come to characterize the American legal system. William H. Erickson, The Pound 
Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 
F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978). Two years later, in 1978, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure discussed refining the scope of discovery in civil litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
26 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment (noting that abuses of discovery led, in part, 
to the 1980 Amendments to Rule 26, which required parties to participate in discovery 
conferences). 
 8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (listing amendment dates). 
 9. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 
13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 1 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article10.pdf (recognizing 
that the increasing volume and scope of information have stressed the litigation system and are 
making searching through discovery prohibitively expensive). 
 10. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 258 F.R.D. 280, 283 (D. Del. 2008). 
 11. Kenneth J. Withers, The Real Cost of Virtual Discovery, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, Feb. 
2001, at 3, 3; see also Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery 
Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 67–68 (2007) (“[E]-discovery is more time-consuming, more 
burdensome, and more costly than conventional discovery.”); Martin H. Redish, Electronic 
Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 592 (2001) (“[E]lectronic discovery can 
be predicted, as a general matter, to give rise to burdens and expense that are of a completely 
different magnitude from those encountered in traditional discovery.”). 
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discovery system is broken”12 and that “[e]lectronic discovery, in 
particular, needs a serious overhaul.”13 Seventy-one percent of the 
survey’s respondents—consisting of a group of trial attorneys from 
both the plaintiffs’ and defense bars—believe that discovery is used as 
“a tool to force settlement.”14 These views are admittedly subjective, 
but they are confirmed by other empirical evidence showing that the 
number of discovery disputes resolved by courts has risen 
precipitously in the past decade—an increase that coincides with the 
ascendancy of electronic discovery.15 
The origins of the problems in the American civil discovery 
system are varied and complex. One principal cause is the American 
rule, which obligates parties to bear their own litigation costs.16 This 
fosters the indiscriminate use of discovery and encourages parties to 
burden their opponents with costly and time-consuming information 
requests. The tandem increase in cost and delay associated with 
discovery can also be traced to the failure of procedural rules to 
adequately limit the scope and amount of discovery permitted, a 
problem that has been exacerbated considerably by electronic 
discovery. The adversarial system itself also promotes discovery 
abuse. This system incentivizes abusive discovery tactics that can 
provide a competitive advantage. Such tactics include coercing a 
settlement by increasing an opponent’s costs through unnecessary 
information requests and compelling an opponent to produce 
 
 12. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 9 (2009), available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ACTL-
IAALS Final Report Revised 4-15-09.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 2. 
 14. Id. at 9. 
 15. During the nearly three-decade period before electronic discovery became 
commonplace in 1998, a total of 3,128 cases involved “discovery disputes.” By contrast, 7,207 
such cases have arisen since 1999, based on a search of Westlaw’s ALLFEDS database 
performed on April 14, 2010. The search updates a search first performed by Professor John S. 
Beckerman. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 505, 508 (2000). Professor Beckerman notes that his figures could potentially be overstated 
because he made no effort to exclude criminal cases or cases in which the phrase “discovery 
dispute” is mentioned only in passing (for example, “this case was free of any discovery 
disputes”). Id. at 508 n.12. I have not attempted to correct for this potential flaw. Professor 
Beckerman justifies his approach by opining that “judges would rarely include the words 
‘discovery dispute’ in a reported opinion unless pretrial litigation actually contained a discovery 
dispute that the judge thought noteworthy.” Id. 
 16. The English rule, in contrast, requires the losing party to bear the legal costs of the 
prevailing party. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (8th ed. 2004). 
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confidential, proprietary, or embarrassing information. Fears of 
malpractice claims also lead attorneys to adopt a leave-no-stone-
unturned approach to discovery. Finally, for a variety of reasons, 
courts have been reluctant to assertively manage the discovery 
process or to impose meaningful sanctions for abuses. 
All of these problems have been exacerbated by the particular 
challenges of electronic discovery. A recent case vividly illustrates 
how electronic documents, particularly email, are vastly altering the 
discovery landscape. In Matter of Fannie Mae Securities Litigation,17 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) was 
served with a third-party subpoena to produce certain emails.18 
OFHEO’s in-house counsel agreed to voluntarily comply with the 
subpoena. Unfortunately, this agreement was made before OFHEO 
comprehended the time and expense that full compliance would 
entail. After OFHEO missed numerous discovery deadlines, the 
district court held the federal agency in contempt.19 The court ordered 
OFHEO to produce all documents responsive to the subpoena, even 
those otherwise protected by privilege. Because many of the emails 
were no longer reasonably accessible and because the plaintiffs 
sought production of 80 percent of all of OFHEO’s emails, the 
federal agency ultimately spent $6 million to comply with the 
subpoena—approximately one-ninth of its entire annual budget.20 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
upheld the contempt citation, rejecting OFHEO’s argument that it 
should not have been compelled to comply with the subpoena in light 
of the excessive costs involved.21 
The Fannie Mae case provides an unsettling glimpse of the future 
of civil litigation in the United States. The burgeoning size and 
complexity of cases,22 coupled with the explosive growth of electronic 
records, is stretching the pretrial discovery process beyond its 
breaking point. Because discovery occupies such an important role in 
the American legal system, resolving this problem is critical. Without 
 
 17. In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 18. Id. at 816. 
 19. Id. at 818. 
 20. Id. at 817. 
 21. Id. at 821–22. 
 22. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 3, at 8 (noting that “the United States has become a 
litigious society in which the courts are being asked to resolve an almost incomprehensible 
spectrum of problems”). 
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reform, the delay, waste, and expense signified by the Fannie Mae 
case will become routine. 
Importantly, effective reform is possible. Some state courts have 
shown how. For example, Oregon’s rules of civil procedure require 
plaintiffs to plead a “plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts 
constituting a claim for relief.”23 This fact-based standard is more 
stringent than the notice-pleading standard in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Similarly, Oregon’s discovery rules are more limited 
than those in the Federal Rules. No more than thirty requests for 
admission are permitted,24 and interrogatories are not permitted at all. 
Notably, a survey conducted in Multnomah County, Oregon, found 
that parties in Oregon state court rarely file discovery-related 
motions.25 These data suggest that Oregon’s stricter pleading and 
discovery standards actually result in higher-quality claims being 
pursued in state court, with less disputed-motion practice impeding 
the orderly administration of cases. 
Similar rule changes would be the most effective way to curb 
discovery abuse at the federal level. In the interim, however, some 
discovery problems can be alleviated under the existing rules if they 
are applied more rigorously. Most notably, judges should institute 
more formalized case-management orders that set clear guidelines for 
discovery early in a case and pay closer attention to discovery 
disputes when they first begin to percolate. 
This Article examines the escalating problems in the U.S. civil 
discovery system and how they can be remedied. Part I reviews the 
origins and development of civil discovery in the United States, which 
sowed the seeds for today’s problems. Part II demonstrates how 
electronic discovery has led to increased abuses of the discovery 
system. Part III discusses prior efforts to reform civil discovery in the 
United States and analyzes why they have been largely ineffective. 
Finally, Part IV proffers potential remedies to the problems, taking 
particular note of the approaches various states have adopted, as well 
as reforms suggested by practitioners. 
 
 23. OR. R. CIV. P. 18A. 
 24. OR. R. CIV. P. 45F. 
 25. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN 
THE OREGON COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY 15–16 (2010) (proposing that 
the stricter limits on discovery in Oregon explain why, out of 495 cases, “only 54 motions 
concerning any aspect of discovery were observed”). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part traces the history of the federal civil-discovery system 
and shows how the gradual weakening of discovery limits increased 
opportunities for abuse and how early reform efforts failed to 
counteract them. 
A. The Origins of Civil Discovery in the United States 
Liberal pretrial discovery is a fundamental component of the 
civil justice system in the United States. But it was not always so. 
American courts initially followed the approach of English courts of 
law, in which pretrial discovery was almost nonexistent.26 In fact, 
under the Field Code,27 which represented the first code of civil 
procedure in the United States and served as the framework for the 
rules of civil procedure in most American courts throughout the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,28 discovery could not begin 
unless a plaintiff could independently state facts to substantiate the 
claims set forth in the complaint.29 Even if a plaintiff could reach the 
discovery phase, few methods of inquiry were available. 
 
 26. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 
1938 Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694 (1998) (“Historically, discovery had been 
extremely limited in both England and the United States.”). Professor Subrin explains that the 
notion of discovery was incongruous with early common law, which viewed litigation “not as a 
rational quest for truth, but rather a method by which society could determine which side God 
took to be truthful or just.” Id. at 694–95. 
 27. The Field Code was drafted by David Dudley Field for New York and subsequently 
adopted by other states. Distrustful of authority—particularly the unelected judiciary—and 
intent on protecting the privacy of individuals against unnecessary intrusion, the Field Code 
provided for extremely limited discovery. Id. at 696. 
 28. By 1928, twenty-eight of the forty-eight states had adopted the Field Code. See 
CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19–20 (1928). Federal 
courts generally followed the Field Code as well. Under the Conformity Act of 1872, federal 
courts were obligated to hew “as near as may be” to the civil procedure rules of the state in 
which they were located. Act of June 1, 1872 (Conformity Act), ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 
(repealed 1948); see also Subrin, supra note 26, at 692 (stating that the Conformity Act of 1872 
was the initial target of criticism for proponents of a uniform set of procedural rules for civil 
cases in law). 
 29. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2241 (1989) (“Under the [Field] codes, a 
plaintiff could not even get into discovery unless she could independently substantiate such 
suspicions, for substantiation had to be manifested in a complaint that stated ‘facts.’”); see also 
Subrin, supra note 26, at 694–97 (asserting that under the Field Code, pleadings were used to, 
among other purposes, “eliminate . . . factual issues and to focus on the controversy”). 
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Interrogatories, for example, were strictly prohibited.30 Depositions, 
document requests, and other discovery practices commonplace in 
modern litigation were rare and could be undertaken only with leave 
of court.31 Depositions, moreover, were not as they are today—only 
the opposing party could be deposed, and only in open court.32 Such 
antagonism to discovery was captured in Carpenter v. Winn.33 In that 
case, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt to “pry into the case of 
[an] adversary to learn its strength or weakness” as an impermissible 
“fishing bill.”34 
This general distrust of discovery, however, did not last. States 
eventually began to liberalize the discovery process. By 1932, some 
were permitting interrogatories, depositions of witnesses, or both.35 
Still, despite these changes, pretrial discovery in state courts remained 
extremely rare.36 This held true in federal courts as well.37  
 
 30. Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an 
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 332 (1988) (“The Field Code eliminated 
equitable bills of discovery, and interrogatories as part of the equitable bill.”). 
 31. Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level 
Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 601 (2002) (stating that under the Field codes, plaintiffs 
had “little opportunity to examine documents that might be relevant and useful, use 
depositions, interrogatories, or other tools of information gathering to facilitate the proof of an 
existing or new theory of the case”). 
 32. Subrin, supra note 30, at 333 (asserting that the depositions permitted by the Code 
were “in lieu of calling the adverse party at the trial, and subject to the same rules of 
examination as at trial” and that a “pretrial deposition . . . was to be before a judge, who would 
rule on evidence objections” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The few federal statutes 
permitting depositions, however, were designed only to preserve the testimony of witnesses who 
could not appear at trial, rather than to uncover new information. At the time, a federal statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 639 (1934), permitted depositions de bene esse, but only when the witness resided 
more than one hundred miles from the court, was at sea or about to leave the United States, or 
was old or infirm. Subrin, supra note 26, at 698. A second federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1934), 
permitted depositions dedimus potestatem, which could be taken only upon a showing that it was 
(i) necessary to avoid the failure or delay of justice, (ii) the witness was beyond the reach of the 
court’s process, (iii) the deposition could not be taken de bene esse, and (iv) the deposition was 
requested in good faith and not for discovery purposes. Subrin, supra note 26, at 698–99 (citing 6 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 app. 100 (3d ed. 1997)). 
 33. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533 (1911). 
 34. Id. at 540. The Massachusetts Supreme Court articulated a similar disdain for 
discovery: “This is what Lord Hardwicke termed a ‘fishing bill,’ to enable the plaintiff to learn 
whether he may sue his judgment against Kingsbury, and levy on the land, with prospect of 
success . . . . As a bill of discovery only, we think it cannot be maintained.” Fiske v. Slack, 38 
Mass. (21 Pick.) 361, 364, 366 (1838) (citations omitted). 
 35. Subrin, supra note 26, at 702–04 (discussing the evolution of the federal discovery rules 
to permit more frequent use of interrogation through the taking of depositions). 
 36. Id. 
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B. Adoption of the Federal Rules 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938. The 
drafters recognized that the absence of pretrial discovery sometimes 
placed litigants at a serious disadvantage, leading to trials by 
ambush.38 Concerned that the outcomes of trials often hinged not on 
the merits of the case but on the skills of counsel or the financial 
resources of the parties, the drafters were determined to implement a 
system that would allow the parties to have the “fullest possible 
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.”39 The drafters believed 
that wide-ranging discovery would help ensure a just determination in 
all matters and remedy the imbalance of power between the wealthy 
and the poor.40 
This shift to liberal discovery was also premised on two practical 
considerations. First, the drafters believed that pretrial discovery 
would greatly reduce litigation costs. Without pretrial discovery, 
parties could not easily discern what positions the opposition would 
assert at trial.41 Prudent litigants therefore adopted an expensive and 
wasteful be-prepared-for-anything approach to trial preparation.42 
The drafters believed that discovery would reveal the strengths and 
weaknesses of each party’s case at an early stage, thereby facilitating 
 
 37. Id. Depositions were the sole discovery permitted in cases at law—aside from a bill of 
particulars. Depositions were also available in equity, but only upon a showing of “good and 
exceptional cause” for departing from the general rule that pretrial discovery was not permitted. 
Id. at 699 (citing FED. R. EQ. 47 (repealed 1938), in GEORGE FREDERICK RUSH, EQUITY 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 221 (1913)). 
 38. William W Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be 
More Effective than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178, 178 (1991) (“Discovery was intended to 
provide each side with all relevant information about the case to help bring about settlement or, 
if not, avoid trial by ambush.”). 
 39. Bell et al., supra note 3, at 6 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). 
 40. See Schwarzer, supra note 38, at 178 (“[The drafters’] purpose was to bring about the 
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”); see also Kathleen L. Blaner, 
Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Donald H. Green, Federal Discovery: Crown Jewel or Curse?, 
LITIGATION, Summer 1998, at 8, 8 (“Discovery was considered a crown jewel because it sought 
to open the courts to all elements of society. The drafters saw an imbalance of power between 
the wealthy and the poor. By mandating a full exchange of information, the drafters thought 
that they could help less powerful litigants prove their legal claims and thus redress the 
imbalance.”). 
 41. See Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 
TENN. L. REV. 737, 737–38 (1939) (explaining that another problem with the prediscovery era 
was that even when the pleadings accurately revealed the parties’ exact positions, they did not 
reveal the nature or source of the proof that would be offered in support). 
 42. Id. 
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early settlements and preserving valuable resources.43 Second, the 
drafters concluded that pretrial discovery would be an efficient and 
self-regulating process.44 Mutual self-interest, coupled with a desire to 
avoid wasting clients’ time and money, would minimize discovery 
disputes and lead to the expeditious exchange of relevant 
information.45 
Importantly, however, the drafters of the original Federal Rules 
dismissed warning signs indicating that these two key premises were 
deeply flawed.46 After all, abuse was already prevalent even under the 
limited discovery that some states permitted at that time. For 
example, a few states permitted depositions but required that the 
deposition be suspended if the parties could not resolve an objection 
themselves. This led to various forms of mischief. In some small 
towns, local lawyers would “take advantage of lawyers from the 
city . . . . Knowing that their opponents [were] . . . not apt to wait over 
until a rather tardy judge compel[led] an answer, they instruct[ed] 
their clients to refuse to answer questions which clearly [were] 
proper.”47 
Other abusive tactics familiar to modern practitioners were also 
common by 1938. In states where parties were entitled to take 
depositions, for instance, parties filed a motion to reschedule or 
modify the scope of the depositions “in nearly every important 
case.”48 In New York, where defendants were permitted discovery 
only as it related to their affirmative defenses, defendants regularly 
included in their answers “fictitious defenses for the sole purpose of 
securing an examination of [the] adversary.”49 Similarly, in states that 
permitted requests for admissions, parties would use such requests 
“as a tactical weapon” by routinely demanding that their opponents 
“admit practically every item of evidence.”50 
 
 43. Bell et al., supra note 3, at 6–7; Schwarzer, supra note 38, at 178. 
 44. Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
Enough Is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REV. 579, 581. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing 
Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 657 (2008) (“[E]ven before the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . were enacted, many feared that excessive discovery would allow plaintiffs to 
blackmail corporate defendants.”). 
 47. Subrin, supra note 26, at 703–04 (quoting GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY 
BEFORE TRIAL 100–01 (1932)). 
 48. Id. at 704 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 67). 
 49. Id. at 705 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 132). 
 50. Id. at 706 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 201). 
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But of all available methods of discovery, interrogatories 
provided the most fertile ground for abuse. Overwhelming an 
opponent with countless generic interrogatories or requests became a 
common tactic. As one commentator notes, this tactic even predated 
the arrival of modern photocopiers.51 Respondents to interrogatories 
also engaged in abusive tactics. As interrogatories became more 
common, respondents began providing vague or ambiguous answers.52 
This distorted the adversarial process, forcing parties to spend time 
litigating the propriety of interrogatories rather than preparing their 
claims and defenses. In Massachusetts, the excessive use of 
interrogatories, combined with the prevalence of evasive answers, 
imposed a “surprisingly heavy” burden on courts, compelling them to 
devote “[a]lmost all of [their] motion hours . . . [to] deciding 
objections to interrogatories.”53 
Despite the extent of these abuses in state courts, the drafters of 
the 1938 Federal Rules radically expanded both the scope of 
permissible discovery and the tools parties could use to obtain it.54 In 
so doing, the drafters went “further than any single jurisdiction’s 
discovery provisions.”55 
C. Early Application of the Federal Rules 
Federal courts initially resisted the broad discovery provisions 
provided in the new rules. Some courts, for example, limited 
discovery to admissible evidence.56 Others allowed the requesting 
 
 51. Id. at 707 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 93). 
 52. Id. at 708 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 95). 
 53. Id. at 707–08 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 94). 
 54. The new discovery tools included depositions upon oral examination, depositions upon 
written examination, interrogatories to parties, requests for production of documents and things 
and entry upon land for inspection and other purposes, physical and mental examinations of 
persons, and requests for admission. FED. R. CIV. P. 30–36. 
 55. Subrin, supra note 26, at 719. The Federal Rules essentially made available all 
discovery tools then in existence, which no state had done at that time. See id. (“[A]t the time 
Sunderland drafted what became the federal discovery rules, no one state allowed the total 
panoply of devices.”). Yet the Federal Rules also included significant limits. For example, 
documents could be examined only upon a court order, and a showing of good cause was 
necessary for the production of documents under the original Rule 34. Moskowitz, supra note 
31, at 603. 
 56. Jonathan M. Redgrave & Ted. S. Hiser, The Information Age, Part I: Fishing in the 
Ocean, A Critical Examination of Discovery in the Electronic Age, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 195, 199 
(2001). Parties were therefore barred from seeking hearsay evidence during depositions. E.g., 
Maryland ex rel. Montvila v. Pan-Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 213, 214–15 (D. Md. 1940); 
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party to use discovery only to build its own case and not to test the 
adversary’s claims or defenses.57 Courts even disagreed over whether 
the discovery devices set out in the Federal Rules could be used 
cumulatively.58 
In response to these and other disputes, the Federal Rules were 
amended in 1946. The 1946 changes were intended to permit 
unfettered discovery. For example, the amendments made clear that 
discovery extended even to inadmissible evidence, provided the 
evidence sought was likely to lead to admissible evidence.59 The 
Supreme Court also lent its imprimatur to unfettered discovery. In 
the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor,60 the Court declared that the 
new discovery rules were “to be accorded a broad and liberal 
treatment” and that “[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing 
expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts 
underlying his opponent’s case.”61 Although Hickman cautioned that 
discovery could not be employed to annoy, embarrass, or oppress an 
adversary,62 it declared that litigants were free to trawl for evidence 
with few meaningful limitations. 
Hickman’s effect was profound. Lower courts began to endorse 
broad discovery, subject only to a nominal and increasingly soft 
relevancy requirement.63 And this problem was not limited to federal 
 
Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F.R.D. 215, 217 (W.D. Mo. 1940); Rose Silk Mills, Inc. v. Ins. Co. 
of N. Am., 29 F. Supp. 504, 505–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 
 57. See, e.g., Poppino, 1 F.R.D. at 218 (“[M]ay [a plaintiff] obtain from his adversary not 
only that evidence which will aid him to make out his case, but also that evidence which his 
adversary might use to make out his defense? We shall be surprised if it shall ever be ruled that 
the Supreme Court had any such revolutionary purpose. Nothing of that kind could be 
accomplished by the old bill of discovery. The function of the bill of discovery was limited to 
discovering what would aid the party seeking discovery in making out his case or his defense.”). 
 58. See Kulich v. Murray, 28 F. Supp. 675, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (denying a motion to vacate 
a deposition made on the grounds that the plaintiff had already “availed himself of every pre-
trial proceeding under the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). 
 59. Redgrave & Hiser, supra note 56, at 199. 
 60. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
 61. Id. at 507. 
 62. Id. at 507–08. 
 63. See, e.g., Reed v. Swift & Co., 11 F.R.D. 273, 274 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (“It is much more 
desirable to allow discovery of facts which may prove to be irrelevant and immaterial than to 
deny discovery which may bring to light facts which are more material to the issues than any 
facts theretofore known.”); Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477, 479 (W.D. Mo. 
1950) (“It is no valid objection to interrogatories propounded under Rule 33 . . . to merely state 
that they are irrelevant to the issues. . . . [T]he relevancy of interrogatories is to be determined 
by their relevancy to the proceedings and subject-matter and not relevancy to the issues in an 
action.”). 
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courts. State courts generally fell in line with the liberal federal 
approach to discovery.64 
D. 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules 
By many accounts, the American discovery system functioned 
reasonably well under the Federal Rules regime for approximately 
the first thirty years.65 But as parties increasingly relied on U.S. courts 
to address various social issues, litigation expanded well beyond what 
the drafters of the Federal Rules could have imagined.66 The passage 
of sweeping civil rights legislation,67 the enactment of harsher criminal 
penalties,68 and the trend toward relying on private litigants instead of 
government agencies to enforce certain laws69 all combined to expand 
the societal role of federal and state courts and to raise the overall 
volume of litigation. 
Increased litigation, in turn, led to calls for still further 
expansions of pretrial discovery. The Supreme Court heeded these 
 
 64. Moskowitz, supra note 31, at 604. 
 65. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 749 (1998) 
(“Party-controlled discovery reached its high-water mark in the 1970 amendments in terms of 
rule provisions.”); see also Blaner et al., supra note 40, at 8 (“Discovery reached its greatest 
expanse in 1970, when the rulemakers consolidated many aspects of the discovery rules and 
revamped Rule 26 to serve as a general guide to discovery.”). 
 66. See Blaner et al., supra note 40, at 8 (noting that the “courts were not yet an instrument 
for social change” when the Federal Rules were drafted). As one expert noted, “[T]he drafters 
[of the Federal Rules] would be amazed at how immense many cases now become and how 
prominent a role discovery plays in that process.” Subrin, supra note 26, at 743. 
 67. See Ishra Solieman, Note, Born Osama: Muslim-American Employment 
Discrimination, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1079–80 (2009) (“Since the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act in 1964, employment-discrimination cases have been on the rise. During the 1990s, federal 
court filings increased three-fold, accounting for nearly 10% of the cases filed in federal district 
courts.” (footnote omitted)); see also Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as 
a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2180–81 n.12 (1989) (noting that Judge 
Richard Posner has theorized that expanding civil rights litigation was part, but not all, of the 
reason federal caseloads ballooned after 1960); Blaner et al., supra note 40, at 8 (identifying 
equal rights legislation as one cause of expanding caseloads). 
 68. See Stuart Taylor Jr., A Quiet Crisis in the Courts, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at 23, 23 
(“The courts have been deluged by criminal trials and appeals, in large part because harsh 
penalties have increased defendants’ incentives to go to trial rather than plead guilty. The new 
sentencing process is so complex and hypertechnical that it takes judges roughly 25 percent 
more time than before.”). In an interview, Federal District Judge Jack B. Weinstein opined that 
the increasing criminal caseload made it “very difficult for any judge to find the time to try civil 
cases.” Kenneth P. Nolan, Weinstein on the Courts, LITIGATION, Spring 1992, at 24, 24. 
 69. See Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (“Congress has 
elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-general as an enforcing mechanism for the anti-
trust laws, the securities laws, environmental laws, civil rights and more.”). 
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calls in 1970 when it empowered the Rules Drafting Committee to 
amend the Federal Rules to lift certain restrictions.70 The 1970 
Amendments abandoned the requirement that a party demonstrate 
good cause before it could request the production of documents.71 
The Amendments also allowed parties to use discovery devices as 
frequently as they wished.72 The floodgates had been opened. 
E. Early Reform Efforts 
The 1970 Amendments triggered an almost immediate backlash. 
Broad opposition to expansive discovery emerged within only a few 
years,73 as confidence in the ability of courts and litigants to manage 
the ever-expanding discovery process began to deteriorate.74 The 1976 
Pound Conference, which had been “convened at the behest of Chief 
Justice Warren Burger to examine the troubled state of litigation,”75 
concluded, 
There is a very real concern in the legal community that the 
discovery process is now being overused. Wild fishing expeditions, 
since any material which might lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence is discoverable, seem to be the norm. Unnecessary 
intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high costs to the 
litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as 
 
 70. See generally Order Prescribing Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
U.S. District Courts, 398 U.S. 977 (1970) (detailing the Supreme Court’s 1970 Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment; Blaner et al., supra 
note 40, at 8. 
 72. See supra note 71. 
 73. Marcus, supra note 65, at 752. The growing dissatisfaction with the discovery process in 
the 1960s and 1970s is evidenced by the significant increase in the literature on the subject of 
discovery and the number of conferences, reports, symposia, meetings, or studies devoted solely 
or primarily to the issue of discovery problems. E.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ 
Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787; 
Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: 
Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 873; Wayne D. 
Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil 
Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217 [hereinafter Brazil, Views from the Front Lines]; 
David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1055 
(1979); David S. Walker, Professionalism and Procedure: Notes on an Empirical Study, 38 
DRAKE L. REV. 759 (1988–89); Note, Federal Discovery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amendments, 
8 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 623 (1972). 
 74. James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. 
Pace & Mary E. Vaina, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Discovery Management: Further Analysis 
of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 624 (1998). 
 75. Bell et al., supra note 3, at 9. 
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a lever toward settlement have come to be part of some lawyers’ 
trial strategy.76 
The growing problems with pretrial discovery compelled state 
courts, which were largely following the approaches of the Federal 
Rules, to begin experimenting with discovery reform in the late 
1970s,77 and prompted the American Bar Association (ABA) to 
convene a study group to examine the problem of discovery abuse.78 
Based on the ABA study group’s 1980 report, the Judicial 
Conference tightened the federal discovery rules in 1980 and 1983.79 
When these reforms proved inadequate, Congress passed the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CRJA),80 triggering a further round of 
 
 76. Erickson, supra note 7, at 288. 
 77. See PATRICIA A. EBENER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COURT EFFORTS TO 
REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY 30 (1981) (“[C]ontrolling the pace of 
discovery is an increasingly common objective of court management, and courts have placed 
limits both on the scope of discovery and the time allowed for it.”). This survey found that 
twenty-nine states and twenty-three of the nation’s largest metropolitan trial courts had 
implemented reforms to expedite pretrial discovery, including using mail and telephone to 
expedite pretrial motions, requiring attorneys to attempt to settle their discovery disputes 
before requesting judicial intervention, delegating resolution of discovery motions to para-
judicial employees, limiting the number of interrogatories, limiting the time allowed for 
discovery, holding conferences to schedule discovery, and authorizing sanctions for frivolous 
discovery motions. Id. 
 78. See generally ABA Section of Litig., Second Report of the Special Committee for the 
Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137 (1980) (examining the problem of discovery abuse). 
 79. Edward D. Cavanaugh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through Local 
Rules, 30 VILL. L. REV. 767, 779–81 (1985). The 1983 Amendments prohibited redundant 
discovery, required that discovery be proportional to the magnitude of the case, and mandated 
court sanctions for violation of the rules. Id. at 788–90. They also explicitly provided for judicial 
discussion of discovery plans at pretrial conferences and for the issuance of an order scheduling 
discovery and other pretrial events. Id. at 782, 785. 
 80. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)). According to the legislative history underlying the 
CJRA, the purpose behind the Act was “to promote for all citizens—rich or poor, individual or 
corporation, plaintiff or defendant—the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes 
in our Nation’s federal courts.” S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6802, 6804. Under the Act, each U.S. district court was required to implement a Civil Justice 
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan under the direction of an advisory group. Id. at 13, reprinted 
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817. The plans served four purposes: (1) to “aid in the resolution of 
civil cases on the merits”; (2) to “monitor discovery”; (3) to “enhance litigation management”; 
and (4) to “assure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil matters.” Lisa J. 
Trembly, Mandatory Disclosure: A Historical Review of the Adoption of Rule 26 and an 
Examination of the Events That Have Transpired Since Its Adoption, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 
425, 434 (1997). 
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study and reforms.81 In addition, the federal discovery rules were 
amended in 1993 to mandate that parties meet and prepare a 
proposed discovery plan early in the case,82 and that certain relevant 
information and evidence be produced regardless of whether it had 
been requested by the opposition.83 The 1993 Amendments also 
limited the number of depositions and interrogatories.84 
These reforms, though well intentioned, failed to stem the delay 
and excessive costs that have become the hallmarks of pretrial 
discovery. In fact, the discovery abuses common today differ little 
from those that concerned the drafters of the original Federal Rules.85 
The frequency and severity of these abuses, however, have changed 
considerably. 
II.  ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY DEEPENS THE PROBLEM 
The advent of electronic discovery has significantly raised the 
stakes in discovery abuse. The volume and costs of discovery in the 
electronic age amount in some cases to billions of pages and millions 
of dollars. Moreover, difficulties in managing and organizing 
electronic data have created opportunities for significant discovery 
abuse by litigants who see an opportunity to increase their opponents’ 
costs and thereby force a settlement of litigation regardless of merit. 
These developments have pushed discovery to the forefront of 
litigation concerns for American businesses. 
 
 81. The CJRA spawned a number of reforms, including mediation and arbitration in civil 
cases. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Rand-ly Criticized: Congressional Court Fix Had Little Effect 
on Cost and Delay, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 14, 14–16 (describing a study evaluating reforms 
spawned by the CJRA). Other reforms adopted by district court judges included automatic 
disclosure and limits on the number of interrogatories and depositions. Carl Tobias, Silver 
Linings in Federal Civil Justice Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 857, 867 (1993). Although some 
have questioned whether the CJRA-inspired reforms reduced the cost or time associated with 
civil discovery, the combination of methods, such as setting trial dates early and having judges 
manage cases upon filing, was effective in reducing the amount of time needed to dispose of 
cases. See Goldberg, supra, at 14. 
 82. Order Prescribing Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 1089, 
1125 (1993). 
 83. Id. at 1118–21. 
 84. Kakalik et al., supra note 74, at 625. 
 85. See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—
“Much Ado About Nothing?,” 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 701 (1995) (“Interestingly, the claims of 
discovery abuse and the types of abuse claimed seem to have remained relatively constant over 
time, even though there have been several amendments to the discovery rules designed 
specifically to cure certain types of abuse.”). 
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A. Electronic Discovery Presents Unique and Urgent Challenges 
1. Electronic Discovery Has Significantly Increased the Volume 
and Cost of Discovery.  The ascendancy of electronic discovery in 
recent years has revealed the need for fundamental changes to the 
American discovery system.86 Modern computer systems have 
exponentially increased the number of documents that companies 
create and retain in the normal course of business.87 According to 
experts, 99 percent of the world’s information is now generated 
electronically.88 Approximately 36.5 trillion emails are sent worldwide 
every year,89 with the average employee sending or receiving 135 
emails each day.90 And email traffic is only the tip of the iceberg. Each 
day, close to 12 billion instant messages are sent worldwide.91 
This surge in the creation of electronic documents is especially 
problematic because modern computer technology permits 
companies to retain vast records almost indefinitely. In 2005, 
ExxonMobil reported to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee that 
it was storing 500 terabytes of electronic information in the United 
States alone. This amounts to 250 billion typewritten pages.92 
Corporate defendants now face the dismaying prospect of combing 
 
 86. See Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance in the Discovery of ESI Since December 1, 
2006, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, ¶ 1 (2008), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v14i3/article8.pdf (“An 
explosion in the amount and discovery of electronically stored information (ESI) threatens to 
clog the federal court system and make judicial determination of the substantive merits of 
disputes an endangered species.”). 
 87. See Mia Mazza, Emmalena K. Quesada & Ashley L. Sternberg, In Pursuit of FRCP 1: 
Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored 
Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 2 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article11.pdf 
(“Advances in computer software and hardware . . . have greatly increased the ability to 
generate, replicate, circulate, and accumulate electronic information.”). 
 88. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A 
VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5 (2008) (citing PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, HOW MUCH 
INFORMATION? 2003, at 1 (2003), http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-
info-2003/printable_report.pdf), available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDiscovery-
FrontLines.pdf. 
 89. See Paul & Baron, supra note 9, ¶ 12 (noting that “[p]robably close to 100 billion emails 
are sent daily”). 
 90. Press Release, LiveOffice, LiveOffice Survey Reveals Organizations Are Unprepared 
for E-Discovery Requests (June 25, 2007), http://www.marketwire.com/mw/rel_us_print.jsp?
id=745509. 
 91. Gene J. Koprowski, Instant Messaging Grew by Nearly 20 Percent in 2005, 
TECHNEWSWORLD (Nov. 10, 2005), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/47270.html. 
 92. Letter from Charles A. Beach, Coordinator, Corp. Litig., ExxonMobil Corp., to Peter 
G. McCabe, Secretary, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (Feb. 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/e-discovery/04-CV-002.pdf. 
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through virtually limitless caches of electronic records every time they 
are threatened with litigation. 
But an ever-growing volume of electronic documents is only part 
of the problem. The harsh reality is that the costs of producing 
electronic documents far exceed those of producing paper documents. 
Unlike paper documents, electronic data must be processed and 
loaded into a special database before they can even be reviewed for 
potential relevance.93 Also, older electronic data are typically stored 
on backup tapes, which can be singularly time-consuming and costly 
to review. The data from such tapes must first be decompressed and 
then processed into a reviewable format.94 Further, because the 
information contained on a backup tape may be recorded in a 
serpentine fashion, “the tape drive must shuttle back and forth 
through the entire tape repeatedly to get to the data.”95 This shuttling 
process occurs at a glacial pace when compared to the speed with 
which computers normally retrieve data. Additionally, because 
backup tapes often lack a directory or catalogue of the information 
they contain, a party may need to search an entire tape—or perhaps 
all of an opponent’s tapes—to locate a single file.96 
Restoring backup tapes for review can easily cost millions of 
dollars. In one case, the defendant estimated a cost of $9.75 million to 
restore backup tapes.97 The cost of reviewing backup tapes can 
become higher still if the data they contain were created on obsolete 
software or hardware, an occurrence that is far from uncommon.98 
 
 93. Among other things, electronic data must be subjected to a process known as de-
duplication, in which identical copies of documents are removed prior to review. This process 
can greatly reduce review costs. 
 94. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE EMERGING 
CHALLENGE OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: STRATEGIES FOR AMERICAN BUSINESSES 3 (2008), 
available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDiscovery-Strategies.pdf (noting that “much 
of the information on the backup tapes is difficult to recover, meaning it must be specially 
processed or translated before it can be used”). 
 95. CRAIG BALL, WHAT JUDGES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DISCOVERY FROM BACKUP 
TAPES 2 (2007), available at http://www.craigball.com/What_Judges_Should_Know_About_
Discovery_from_Backup_Tapes-corrected.pdf. 
 96. Sarah A.L. Phillips, Comment, Discoverability of Electronic Data Under the Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Effective Are Proposed Protections 
for “Not Reasonably Accessible” Data?, 83 N.C. L. REV. 984, 991 (2005). 
 97. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (“If the emails on all of the back-up tapes were produced instead of a sample of eight 
sessions, the total cost would mushroom to almost $9,750,000.”). 
 98. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 88, at 13. 
Businesses often find that older data cannot be easily retrieved because they were created with 
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These substantial costs have not, however, dissuaded courts from 
routinely ordering defendants to restore and search backup tapes for 
potentially responsive documents.99 
Further escalating the costs of electronic discovery are the 
qualitative differences between electronic and paper documents. As 
the drafters of the Federal Rules observed, most people adopt a more 
informal style when drafting emails, text messages, and instant 
messages, a practice that tends to make privilege review “more 
difficult, and . . . correspondingly more expensive.”100 The casual 
milieu of email and other electronic communications also gives rise to 
linguistic ambiguities that further complicate the reviewer’s task. 
Employees frequently devise their own abbreviations and shorthand 
terminology for such correspondence,101 a convention that leaves 
reviewing attorneys unable to comprehend documents without 
guidance from the authors.102 
The additional costs associated with production of electronic 
records can be considerable. One expert estimates the cost of 
producing a single electronic document to be as high as $4.103 Verizon, 
which has devoted considerable attention to electronic discovery 
issues, has estimated that producing one gigabyte of data—the 
equivalent of between 15,477 and 677,963 printed pages104—costs 
between $5,000 and $7,000.105 But far more than a single gigabyte of 
data will often be at issue. Commentators opine that even a typical 
midsize case now involves at least 500 gigabytes of data, resulting in 
costs of $2.5 to $3.5 million for electronic discovery alone.106 Another 
study found that from 2006 to 2008, the average surveyed company 
 
software that is no longer in production or are stored on media that is no longer supported by 
the manufacturer. Restoring this type of data is a laborious and expensive process. Id. 
 99. Phillips, supra note 96, at 992. 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 101. See Stephanie Raposo, Quick! Tell Us What KUTGW Means, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 
2009, at D1 (“In many offices, a working knowledge of text-speak is becoming de rigueur.”). 
 102. See Paul & Baron, supra note 9, ¶ 38 (“Thus, it is not surprising that lawyers and those 
to whom they delegate search tasks may not be particularly good at ferreting out responsive 
information through the use of simple keyword search terms.”). These abbreviations also 
complicate the process of locating relevant documents in the first instance, as keyword searches 
may not incorporate these key terms. 
 103. Ann G. Fort, Mandatory E-Discovery: Compliance Can Create David and Goliath 
Issues, Reminiscent of the Early Days of Sarbanes-Oxley, DAILY REP., Mar. 19, 2007, at 13. 
 104. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 88, at 29 n.2. 
 105. Id. at 5. 
 106. Id. 
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spent between $621,880 and $2,993,567 per case on electronic 
discovery.107 At the high end, companies in the study reported average 
per-case discovery costs ranging from $2,354,868 to $9,759,900.108 
The costs of electronic discovery are continuing to rise. One 
report indicates that the volume of information, including 
electronically stored information, is growing at a rate of 30 percent 
annually.109 The growing cache of electronic information drives up 
costs, as companies are forced to cull through ever-larger stockpiles 
of data to identify responsive documents. According to the influential 
Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery Survey, expenditures for the 
collection and processing of electronic documents in the United 
States will reach $4.7 billion in 2010, an increase of 15 percent over 
the prior year.110 Notably, this figure does not include the cost of 
reviewing these documents for responsiveness or privilege, a process 
that can comprise between 75 and 90 percent of the cost of producing 
electronic records.111 
The rising costs associated with electronic discovery threaten to 
drive all but the largest cases out of the system.112 A report released in 
2008 by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice warns that in low-value 
cases, the costs of electronic discovery “could dominate the 
underlying stakes in dispute.”113 But even in large cases, the volume of 
electronic information is growing so fast that traditional techniques of 
identifying and reviewing documents are breaking under the strain.114 
 
 107. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 3 (2010), available at 
http://civilconference.uscourts.gov (follow “Empirical Research, Pt. 2” hyperlink; then follow 
“Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies” hyperlink). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See LYMAN & VARIAN, supra note 88, at 2 (estimating that “new stored information 
grew about 30% a year between 1999 and 2002”). 
 110. George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, Mining for Gold, LAW TECH. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2008), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTNC.jsp?id=1202435497600&Mining_f
or_Gold&hbxlogin=1#. 
 111. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS, NICHOLAS M. PACE & ROBERT H. ANDERSON, RAND INST. 
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: 
OPTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 3 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_
papers/2008/RAND_OP183.pdf. 
 112. When Supreme Court Justice Breyer was informed at a conference several years ago 
that discovery in a routine case might cost $4 million, he remarked, “We can’t do that . . . . If it 
really costs millions of dollars, then you’re going to drive out of the litigation system people who 
ought to be there.” Daniel Fisher, The Data Explosion: Lawyers Charge a Lot for Discovery and 
Aren’t Even Very Good at It. That Spells Opportunity for H5, FORBES, Oct. 1, 2007, at 72, 73. 
 113. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 111, at 3. 
 114. Ken Withers, When E-Mail Explodes, SAN DIEGO LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 36, 37. 
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Several cases have already involved more than one billion potentially 
relevant electronic documents.115 Even if only 1 percent of the 
documents in such cases were reviewed for possible production, it 
would likely take 100 people nearly 7 months and $20 million to 
conduct an initial review.116 In light of projected growth rates for 
electronic documents, it may soon become too expensive for lawyers 
merely to search through their clients’ computer files to identify 
potentially responsive documents.117 
Electronic data also present unique challenges with regard to 
collecting potentially responsive documents. Most companies have 
little idea what documents exist in their computer systems or precisely 
where those documents are located.118 The sheer volume of electronic 
documents created by modern businesses simply makes cataloguing 
or organizing the documents too difficult and expensive. The ease 
with which computer records can be created further complicates 
document-collection efforts. For example, employees can save huge 
swaths of information on desktop computers, laptops, and portable 
storage devices without anyone else’s knowledge. Merely identifying 
all versions of a particular document can be inordinately difficult 
because an employee may have forwarded the document to a large 
number of individuals, each of whom may have edited it and saved it 
 
 115. John H. Jessen, Special Issues Involving Electronic Discovery, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 425, 428 (2000). 
 116. Paul & Baron, supra note 9, ¶ 20. 
 117. See id. ¶ 1 (noting that “it is becoming prohibitively expensive for lawyers even to 
search through information”). 
 118. As the Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Retention and 
Production notes, 
Neither the users who created the data nor information technology personnel are 
necessarily aware of the existence and locations of the copies. For instance, a word 
processing file may reside concurrently on an individual’s hard drive, in a network-
shared folder, as an attachment to an email, on a backup tape, in an internet cache, 
and on portable media such as a CD or floppy disk. Furthermore, the location of 
particular electronic files typically is determined not by their substantive content, but 
by the software with which they were created, making organized retention and review 
of those documents difficult. 
SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE 
SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES 
FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 2 n.5 (2007), available at http://
www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf; see also Ross 
Chaffin, Comment, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising Cost and Importance 
of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 123 (2006) (noting that, thanks to 
email, it is entirely possible that documents and correspondence may reside in “unexpected” 
places). 
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on a personal computer.119 Cases in which companies have been 
sanctioned for failing to locate all responsive electronic documents 
abound.120 In Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,121 for example, the 
plaintiff’s counsel failed to identify key emails until after trial had 
begun, resulting in an $8.5 million sanction.122 
Preservation of electronic data also presents litigants with special 
challenges and costs. Once a lawsuit can be reasonably anticipated, 
both parties are obliged to preserve all potentially relevant 
evidence.123 Although this is generally a simple task for hard-copy 
documents, it poses considerable difficulties for electronic files for 
several reasons: First, the sheer volume and diversity of electronic 
data make preservation a challenge. Second, electronic data can be—
and, in some cases, are intended to be—ephemeral. Dynamic 
databases, in which data are constantly being added, modified, and 
removed, can be extremely difficult to preserve for an extended 
period of time.124 Third, computer systems typically include 
housekeeping programs that automatically delete data that are no 
longer useful.125 Unless suspended, these programs can destroy 
relevant evidence. Fourth, certain electronic information, such as 
deleted files and metadata,126 is not visible to normal users.127 
 
 119. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 94, at 2 
(“Even information you know you have—such as emails—may be more challenging to produce 
because discovery requests frequently seek even slightly different copies of the same document, 
and the ability to forward email easily often makes it difficult to determine how many copies 
exist.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing cases involving sanctions for 
nonproduction of evidence). See generally Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., Rose Hunter Jones & 
Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789 
(2010) (discussing sanctions for e-discovery violations). 
 121. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. 
Jan. 7), vacated in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). 
 122. Id. at *17. 
 123. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(“The authority to sanction parties for spoliation arises jointly under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the court’s own inherent powers. . . . The duty to preserve attached at the time 
that litigation was reasonably anticipated.”). 
 124. Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-
Discovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ¶ 7 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/ 
article9.pdf. 
 125. See id. (“[R]outine business processes are often designed to free up storage space for 
other uses without any intent to impede the preservation of potential evidence for use in 
discovery.”). 
 126. “Metadata, commonly described as ‘data about data,’ is defined as ‘information 
describing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document.’” Williams v. 
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Although this invisible information can be the most vital evidence in 
a case,128 it is frequently destroyed in the normal course of business.129 
For these reasons, the burdens (and costs) of preserving electronic 
information can be extreme. As ExxonMobil noted to the Federal 
Rules Advisory Committee, if a court ordered the company to 
interrupt the recycling of its backup systems, the annual cost of extra 
backup tapes for maintaining its electronic data in the United States 
alone would amount to $23.76 million.130 
2. Electronic Discovery Has Opened New Avenues for Abuse.  
The massive amount of discoverable electronic material and the 
difficulties associated with its collection and preservation make 
discovery “unpredictable and increasingly subject to abuse.”131 
Counsel now recognize that electronically stored information is useful 
not only as a litigation tool, but also as a litigation tactic. The marked 
rise in the use of spoliation claims as a tactical maneuver underscores 
this evolution.132 Further, as one expert has noted, the intricacies of 
modern computer systems all but guarantee that some relevant 
electronic evidence will be lost or destroyed in any given case.133 This 
 
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) 
advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment). Metadata can reveal “how, when and by whom 
[a document] was collected, created, accessed, or modified and how it is formatted (including 
data demographics such as size, location, storage requirements and media information).” 
SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT 
RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES & 
COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE app. F 
at 94 (2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf. 
 127. When a user deletes a file, the document remains on the computer’s hard drive until 
the space it occupies is needed for another document. See SHARON D. NELSON, BRUCE A. 
OLSON & JOHN W. SIMEK, THE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY HANDBOOK 293 
(2006). 
 128. Kenneth Starr’s team discovered “the infamous ‘talking points’ document” on Monica 
Lewinsky’s computer even though she had deleted it. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rebkin, 
Electronic Discovery in Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 329 
(2000). 
 129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Notably, a document’s metadata can be 
destroyed merely by opening or accessing the document. See SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING 
GRP. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., supra note 126, app. E 
at 80 & n.1. 
 130. Letter from Charles A. Beach to Peter G. McCabe, supra note 92, at 2. 
 131. Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards Regarding Electronic Discovery, 68 
DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 206 (2001). 
 132. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 88, at 21. 
 133. Arthur L. Smith, Responding to the “E-Discovery Alarm,” BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.–Oct. 
2007, at 27, 28. 
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admittedly anecdotal observation is bolstered by a recent survey, 
which found that more than 90 percent of companies have failed to 
adopt procedures to preserve electronic data in the event of 
litigation.134 As a result, savvy plaintiffs’ counsel have an incentive to 
request some electronic documents not because they are relevant but 
rather in hopes of securing a large sanction when the opposing party 
cannot produce them.135 Spoliation claims have thus given plaintiffs’ 
attorneys a “nuclear weapon” that can be used to force large 
organizations to settle frivolous cases.136 
Some commentators have attempted to refute the widely 
accepted characterization of American civil discovery as 
disproportionately expensive and prone to abuse. But these scholars 
have erroneously asserted that claims of discovery abuse rest on 
unfounded perceptions that have been exaggerated by certain 
probusiness interests and reinforced by American media outlets.137 
 
 134. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 88, at 9 (citing 
James Powell, IT Dangerously Unprepared for E-Discovery, Survey Shows, ENTERPRISE SYS. 
(Mar. 30, 2009), http://esj.com/articles/2007/03/20/it-dangerously-unprepared-for-ediscovery-
survey-shows.aspx). 
 135. Although the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a safe 
harbor that precludes sanctions for electronic documents lost or destroyed through ordinary or 
good-faith computer use, courts have rarely invoked this provision and have construed it 
narrowly when they do. See id. at 12 (“In practice, however, the ‘safe harbor’ is vague and 
difficult to work with, and consequently has rarely driven the courts’ spoliation and sanctions 
analysis. Some courts have warned that the ‘safe harbor’ addresses only rule-based sanctions; 
courts still retain inherent powers to impose sanctions for the loss of [electronically stored 
information].” (footnote omitted)). 
 136. Id. at 21. The risk that electronic discovery will be used as a weapon is particularly 
acute in cases such as employment disputes, in which the plaintiff possesses virtually no 
discoverable information. Id. at 23. 
 137. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 
1398–99 (1994) (characterizing American “litigiousness” and “discovery abuse” as a myth that is 
largely attributable to misinformation disseminated by the media); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas 
E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 787 
(2010) (agreeing with the “‘myth’ characterization”); see also Sorenson, supra note 85, at 702 
(“In light of the attention discovery abuse has received for the last thirty years or so and the 
efforts that have been made to control abuse, the intractability and persistence of the abuse 
claims suggest either that the partisan incentives to engage in discovery abuse are very strong or 
that perhaps many abusive discovery practices identified by commentators and judges are not 
really considered abusive by a large number of lawyers.”); Peggy E. Bruggman, Reducing the 
Costs of Civil Litigation: Discovery Reform, PUB. L. RESEARCH INST. (1995), http://
w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/discov.html (describing the findings of a 1978 Federal Judicial 
Center study, as affirmed by a 1990–93 study by the National Center of State Courts, that 
showed “that discovery abuse is not as prevalent as is otherwise assumed”); Amelia F. 
Burroughs, Comment, Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 91–92 (2001) (disputing that the empirical data 
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These commentators rely on empirical studies that appear to 
contradict the conventional wisdom that discovery is a costly and 
often abusive diversion from litigating the merits of a case.138 
According to these studies, discovery is efficient and cost-effective in 
the majority of cases, and instances of abuse and runaway costs are 
limited to a small number of highly complex and overly contentious 
lawsuits.139 But most of these studies suffer from a common flaw: they 
were conducted well before the explosion of electronic discovery 
within the last decade.140 The previously unimaginable volumes of 
information that are now commonplace in litigation have so shifted 
the discovery landscape that findings predating the email revolution 
are no longer valid.141 
 
on discovery rates in civil cases and resources expended on discovery adequately support a clear 
finding of discovery abuse). 
 138. Studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center are an example. E.g., PAUL R. 
CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL 
CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978), available at http://
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/jcclpdis.pdf/$file/jcclpdis.pdf (reporting the results of a 1978 
Federal Judicial Center study); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research 
on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 800 (1998) (reviewing various economic and behavioral 
studies on discovery and commenting that “[i]n the vast majority of cases, discovery appears to 
be the self-executing system the rules contemplate”); Mullenix, supra note 137, at 1433 (arguing 
that “the 1978 [Federal Judicial Center] study is important because it found that discovery abuse 
was not a serious problem and consequently ended contemporaneous efforts to amend the 
discovery rules”); Lee & Willging, supra note 137, at 787 (relying on the FJC study and 
concluding that “discovery and overall litigation costs were largely proportionate to stakes, and 
that the stakes in a case were the single best predictor of overall costs”); see also Mullenix, supra 
note 137, at 1436 (“[D]iscovery abuse, to the extent it exists, does not permeate the vast 
majority of federal filings.” (quoting CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 138, at 35)). 
 139. Willging et al., supra note 5, at 527. 
 140. Indeed, a 2009 study by the Federal Judicial Center confirms that litigation costs “were 
higher in cases with electronic discovery . . . and in cases with more reported types of 
discovery.” EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, 
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2, 35–37 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf (reporting the results of a 2009 Federal Judicial 
Center study). 
 141. Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center has acknowledged as much and has launched a new 
study of the impact of electronic documents on the discovery process. See Letter from Judge 
Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. for Civil Rules, to the Members 
of the ABA Litig. Section (July 21, 2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/
survey/0709-FederalJudicialCenter.html (requesting Section members to respond to a 
questionnaire on civil litigation, particularly discovery, in the federal courts). 
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B. The Increased Costs of Electronic Discovery Far Outweigh Any 
Benefit to Keeping the Current Discovery System 
A 2008 study of the fellows of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers conducted jointly by the American College of Trial Lawyers 
and the University of Denver’s Institute for the Advancement of the 
American Legal System (ACTL-IAALS Report) confirms that 
efforts to rein in discovery costs and end discovery abuse have 
generally failed. The ACTL-IAALS Report concluded unequivocally 
that “[o]ur discovery system is broken.”142 The report further 
determined that some meritorious cases are never filed because “the 
cost of pursuing them fails a rational cost-benefit test,” and that cases 
of “questionable merit and smaller cases are settled rather than tried 
because it costs too much to litigate them.”143 Nearly 71 percent of the 
respondents believe “that discovery is used as a tool to force 
settlement,”144 and nearly half of the respondents feel that “discovery 
is abused in every case.”145 The ACTL-IAALS Report also makes 
clear that electronic discovery has greatly exacerbated the cost and 
delay already inherent in the discovery process. The report concludes 
that “[e]lectronic discovery . . . needs a serious overhaul.”146 In fact, 75 
percent of the respondents surveyed in the ACTL-IAALS Report 
agreed that “discovery costs, as a share of total litigation costs, have 
increased disproportionately due to the advent of [electronic 
discovery].”147 Even more respondents, 87 percent, said that electronic 
discovery “increases the costs of litigation.”148 One of the survey’s 
respondents described electronic discovery as a “morass.”149 
To the extent discovery is intended to aid the search for truth, 
these costs are not being offset by any discernible benefit. A 2008 
 
 142. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., supra note 12, at 9. 
 143. Id. at 2. 
 144. Id. at 9. 
 145. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM app. A at A-4 (2008) (emphasis added), available at http://www.
actl.com/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/cm/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3650. 
 146. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., supra note 12, at 2. 
 147. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., supra note 145, app. A at A-4. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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survey of Fortune 200 companies found that, in cases with total 
litigation costs of more than $250,000, the ratio of the average 
number of discovery pages to the average number of exhibit pages—
that is, pages actually utilized in some fashion at trial—was 1,044 to 
1.150 Similarly, in one survey of attorneys in Chicago, practitioners 
estimated that 60 percent of discovery materials did not justify the 
cost associated with obtaining them.151 The Chicago study revealed 
that in more than 50 percent of complex cases, the opposition’s 
discovery efforts had failed to disclose significant evidence.152 This 
result led the study’s author to wonder whether the civil discovery 
system is functioning acceptably when, “with considerable 
inefficiency and at great cost, it distributes information among the 
parties fairly evenly in less than half of the larger cases.”153 
C. Discovery Now Ranks as a Top Litigation Concern for Major 
Corporate Defendants 
The unchecked rise in discovery costs has attracted the attention 
of corporations, which now list discovery as one of their most pressing 
concerns when litigation is imminent.154 This concern is well founded. 
Discovery costs in U.S. commercial litigation are growing at an 
explosive rate; estimates indicate they reached $700 million in 2004, 
$1.8 billion in 2006, and $2.9 billion in 2007.155 And these figures do 
not even account for the billions of dollars that corporations pay each 
year to settle frivolous lawsuits because the burdens of litigating until 
summary judgment or a favorable verdict are too onerous. 
The costs of tort litigation in the United States also drive up the 
costs to consumers of purchasing a variety of goods. A study 
conducted in 2002 by the president’s Council of Economic Advisers 
(CEA) concluded that the direct and indirect costs of excessive tort 
litigation in the United States drive up production costs, which must 
 
 150. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 107, app. at 16. 
 151. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines, supra note 73, at 230 n.24. 
 152. Id. at 234. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, THIRD ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY 
FINDINGS 18 (2006), available at http://www.fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/2006/Fulbrights
ThirdAnnualLitigationTrendsSurveyFindings.pdf (reporting that 81 percent of 422 international 
companies surveyed felt that they were not “well-prepared” for electronic discovery issues). 
 155. Robert H. Thornburg, Electronic Discovery in Florida, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2006, at 34, 34; 
Leigh Jones, Faced with Data Explosion, Firms Tap Temp Attorneys, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 14, 2005), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1128947761813. 
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ultimately be borne by consumers and employees.156 The recent 
survey of Fortune 200 companies found that their U.S. litigation costs 
ate up 0.51 percent of their U.S.-derived revenue, while their foreign 
litigation costs consumed a mere 0.06 percent of their non-U.S. 
revenue in 2008.157 The CEA has concluded that these additional costs 
impose a 2 percent tax on consumer prices and a 3 percent tax on 
wages.158 Inasmuch as discovery costs comprise the majority of 
litigation expenses,159 discovery abuse is primarily responsible for this 
litigation tax.160 And with the rapid escalation of discovery costs in the 
electronic age, this tax is set to increase considerably. 
The litigation tax has a number of adverse effects on the 
American economy. First, it hampers productivity and innovation. 
Research shows that corporations expecting high litigation costs will 
forgo research and withhold new products from the market to 
conserve funds for legal expenses.161 Indeed, under financial 
accounting rules applicable in the United States, public companies are 
obligated to create financial reserves when potential legal liabilities 
become sufficiently certain.162 These litigation reserves divert 
significant funds from productive uses and can even drive major 
corporations into the red.163 Further, the discovery-related delays 
 
 156. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS? AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 13 (2002), available at 
http://www.heartland.org/custom/semod_policybot/pdf/13266.pdf (reasoning that litigation costs 
will “ultimately be borne by individuals through job loss or a reduction in wages (workers), [or] 
an increase in consumer prices (consumers)”). 
 157. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 107, at 13 fig.9. 
 158. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 156, at 1. 
 159. See Richard K. Herrman, Vincent J. Poppiti & David K. Sheppard, Managing 
Discovery in a Digital Age: A Guide to Electronic Discovery in the District of Delaware, 8 DEL. 
L. REV. 75, 75 (2005) (“Discovery traditionally proves to be the most expensive aspect of 
litigation.”). 
 160. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 156, at 1, 7 (using the term “litigation 
tax” because “[t]o the extent that tort claims are economically excessive, they act like a tax on 
individuals and firms”). 
 161. See John Engler & Lawrence J. McQuillan, Op-Ed., Limiting Lawsuit Abuses Lowers 
Costs from Litigation, Creates Jobs in Long Run, DETROIT NEWS, May 14, 2008, at 15A (“Fear 
of lawsuits . . . causes companies to withhold beneficial products from markets . . . .”). 
 162. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARD NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES ¶ 8 (1975). Under this standard, a 
company must create a litigation loss reserve if a loss is “probable” and the amount of the 
expected loss is material and reasonably estimable. Id. 
 163. See Ruthie Ackerman, Hutchinson Hit by Litigation Charge, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2008, 
6:30 PM ET), http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/30/hutchinson-technology-diskdrive-markets-
equity-cx-ra-0130markets27.html (reporting that Hutchinson posted a $2.5 million charge to 
settle class-action litigation); Steven E.F. Brown, Lawsuit Settlement Pushes McKesson to $20M 
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endemic to the American civil litigation system indicate that such 
economic deprivation can last for a considerable period. 
The litigation tax also hampers the international competitiveness 
of U.S. companies, a crucial handicap in this era of increasing 
globalization. The U.S. tort liability system is now the most expensive 
in the world.164 Costs associated with tort claims have risen almost 
continuously since 1950.165 As a percentage of GDP, tort costs in the 
United States are triple those in France and at least double those in 
Germany and Japan.166 Even the United Kingdom, after whose system 
of jurisprudence the American system was modeled, is seen by 
foreign investors as having a “significant cost advantage compared to 
the United States.”167 
Finally, the litigation tax and the uncertainties inherent in the 
U.S. tort liability system dissuade foreign companies from opening 
factories and otherwise doing business in the United States.168 This is a 
keenly felt loss in an era of economic retrenchment and declining 
employment. One report goes so far as to conclude that rising 
 
Loss, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009), http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/
2009/01/26/daily12.html (reporting that McKesson Corp. took a $493 million charge to settle 
pending litigation and create a reserve against future claims); Sherri Begin Welch, Kelly Services 
Blames Litigation Charge for 3Q Loss, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Nov. 14, 2008, 2:46 PM), 
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20081114/FREE/811149958 (noting that absent the $22.5 
million litigation charge, Kelly Services’s CEO said the company would have had a small 
quarterly profit); Xerox Posts Loss on Litigation Charge, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at 4 
(reporting that Xerox took a $491 million charge to cover the costs of a lawsuit). 
 164. See Ted Frank, A Stimulus You Can Believe In, THE AMERICAN (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.american.com/archive/2009/may-2009/a-stimulus-you-can-believe-in (“The direct 
costs to the United States of tort litigation are $252 billion a year, 1.8 percent of GNP, twice that 
of a typical industrialized nation.”). 
 165. TILLINGHAST, TOWERS PERRIN, 2006 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 5 (2006), 
available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2006/200611/
Tort_2006_FINAL.pdf. 
 166. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE U.S. LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT AND FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT: SUPPORTING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS BY REDUCING LEGAL COSTS AND 
UNCERTAINTY 1 (2008), available at http://www.locationusa.com/USDepartmentOfCommerce/
pdf/litigationFDI.pdf. 
 167. Id. at 4. Lord Leonard Hoffman, explaining why even the United Kingdom has lower 
tort costs than the United States, identifies several reasons—namely, “no punitive damages, 
limits on pain and suffering, no contingency fees, loser pays, no juries in most civil cases, and a 
trial bar with almost no political influence.” Id. 
 168. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 166, at 5–6 (noting survey data indicating 
that the litigation environment “is likely to impact important business decisions . . . such as 
where to locate or do business” and describing studies showing international investor concerns 
with the U.S. legal environment); Philip Howard, Beyond Tort Reform, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 5, 2007, 
at 9 (“Foreign companies are being scared away in part . . . by soaring costs of American law.”). 
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litigation costs are even threatening the preeminence of the U.S. 
securities markets.169 
III.  RECENT EFFORTS TO CURB DISCOVERY ABUSE 
Growing anxiety over the rapidly escalating costs and delay 
endemic to discovery in civil litigation has spawned two attempts over 
the last decade to reform federal discovery rules. These reforms 
included limiting the scope of discovery and addressing the new 
challenges posed by electronic documents. Unfortunately, both 
reform efforts have proven largely ineffectual. 
A. The 2000 Amendments 
Prior to 2000, parties were entitled to discovery into “any 
matter . . . relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action.”170 But in 2000, amendments to the Federal Rules were 
introduced, seeking to narrow this broad scope of permissible 
discovery by establishing a new, two-tiered discovery protocol.171 
Under this new protocol, parties are initially entitled to discover only 
information that is “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”172 
Only if such discovery is inadequate may a court, “[f]or good cause,” 
permit discovery into “any matter relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the action.”173 The two-tiered procedure was designed to 
prevent parties from using discovery “to develop new claims and 
defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings.”174 
The other main change effected by the 2000 Amendments 
involved pretrial disclosures—early disclosures that are intended to 
clarify what documents each party has and to diminish the need for 
formal discovery requests. Prior to 2000, courts could promulgate 
local rules setting forth whether parties were required to make initial 
disclosures. More than half of the federal district courts opted out of 
imposing the requirement, resulting in a “patchwork and fragmented 
 
 169. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND 
THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 75–77 (2006), available at http://www.
nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf. 
 170. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1993) (amended 2000) (emphasis added). 
 171. See Order Prescribing Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 529 U.S. 
1155, 1165 (1999) (amending Rule 26(b)(1) to create a two-tiered discovery system). 
 172. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) (amended 2006) (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
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system.”175 To unify these divergent approaches, the 2000 
Amendments implemented two changes. First, they required all 
parties (except in specified types of cases) to make initial disclosures, 
unless the parties agree or the court orders otherwise.176 Second, they 
limited the information that must be disclosed to that which the 
disclosing party may use to support its position.177 
Like their predecessors, the 2000 Amendments failed to rein in 
abusive discovery practices.178 The bench and bar have largely ignored 
the Amendments’ limitation on the scope of discovery, clinging 
instead to entrenched notions of liberal information gathering.179 The 
reasons are numerous, but they stem in large part from an inability to 
discern a meaningful difference between the pre- and post-2000 
discovery standards. Attempting to distinguish between information 
relevant to “the subject matter of the dispute” and information 
relevant to “a claim or defense” has been dismissed by one court as 
“the juridical equivalent to debating the number of angels that can 
 
 175. Peter J. Beshar & Kathryn E. Nealon, Changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 1, 2000, at 1. 
 176. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (2000) (amended 2006) & advisory committee’s note to 2000 
amendment. 
 177. See id. advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (explaining that initial disclosure 
obligation issues unrelated to expert witness testimony have “been narrowed to identification of 
witnesses and documents that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses”). 
 178. In one sense, this should come as no surprise, given that the drafters of these 
amendments “determined expressly not to review the question of discovery abuse.” 
Memorandum from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge 
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 
F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000); see also AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 12, at 10 (noting that two-thirds of 
respondents believe that the amendments to the Federal Rules between 1976 and 2006 have not 
remedied the problem of discovery abuse). 
 179. See Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of 
Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 126 (2005) 
(“What has been my experience with the concept of bifurcated discovery under the 2000 
amendment? (1) Attorneys do not as a general rule attempt to limit discovery to that which is 
relevant to a claim or defense; and (2) attorneys do not as a general rule address the existence of 
good cause, either to argue for broader discovery as Rule 26(b)(1) contemplates or to counter 
such arguments.”); Noyes, supra note 11, at 61 (“[D]espite the 2000 amendments, the Rule has 
been ignored.”); Noyes, supra note 11, at 67 (“Instead, many lower courts have acknowledged 
the 2000 amendments but have interpreted them as having changed nothing.”); Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil 
Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 24–25 (2001) (“First, in nearly all instances it appears that the 
outcomes would have been the same under either version of the rule; indeed, it is striking how 
little the courts’ opinions reflect any apparent serious effort by parties who are resisting 
discovery to make anything out of this new and perhaps still unfamiliar scope definition.”). 
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dance on the head of a pin.”180 The 2000 Amendments also fail to 
provide any practical guidance as to when good cause exists for 
broadening discovery to include information relevant to the subject 
matter of the dispute.181 Without such guidance, courts have generally 
ignored the two-tiered discovery system and applied the more 
familiar pre-2000 discovery standard.182 As a result, plaintiffs can still 
routinely engage in fishing expeditions and compel the production of 
documents and information that are only tangentially related to the 
claims or defenses at issue.183 
 
 180. Thompson v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Md. 2001). 
 181. See Beckerman, supra note 15, at 541 (“[The amendment] offers no assistance in 
determining what constitutes ‘good cause’ that should be sufficient for a judge to justify granting 
discovery relevant to the subject matter of the action rather than simply to the claims and 
defenses of the parties.”). 
 182. See Saket v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02 C 3453, 2003 WL 685385, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 
2003) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate liberal discovery, and ‘relevancy’ 
under Rule 26 is extremely broad.”); Richmond v. UPS Serv. Parts Logistics, No. IP01-1412-C-
K/H, 2002 WL 745588, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 25, 2002) (“The implementation of amended Rule 
26 did not necessarily impact the so called ‘liberal discovery’ standard as evidenced by cases 
interpreting the post-amendment rule.”); World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris 
Agency, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 263, 265 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) do 
not dramatically alter the scope of discovery . . . .”); Noyes, supra note 11, at 61 (“[D]espite the 
2000 amendments, the Rule has been ignored.”). But see United States ex rel. Stewart v. 
Louisiana Clinic, No. Civ.A. 99-1767, 2003 WL 21283944, at *8 (E.D. La. June 4, 2003) 
(emphasizing that the 2000 Amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) narrowed the scope of discovery); 
Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Research Corp., No. 01 CIV.8115(MBM)(FM), 2002 WL 31235717, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2002) (upholding the denial of a discovery request and distinguishing a case 
allowing broad discovery on the ground that the 2000 Amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) had 
narrowed the scope of discovery); Hill v. Motel 6, 205 F.R.D. 490, 492–93 (S.D. Ohio 2001) 
(emphasizing that after the 2000 Amendments, “Rule 26(b)(1) now focuses discovery on the 
actual claims and defenses at issue in the case” and denying a discovery request because the 
documents sought would have been relevant only to a discriminatory-impact claim, not to the 
plaintiff’s discriminatory-treatment claim). 
 183. In Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679 (D. Kan. 2001), for example, an individual 
plaintiff sought discovery from the broker defendants in a securities fraud suit seeking proceeds 
data for a six-year period. Id. at 688–89. The defendants, however, argued the only relevant time 
period was the one year when the plaintiff contemplated and purchased the stock. Id. at 689. 
Ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the court declared its understanding of the scope of discovery in 
light of the new standard: “Relevancy is broadly construed, and . . . discovery should be allowed 
unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claim or 
defense of a party.” Id. (emphasis omitted and added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Similarly, in Bryant v. Farmers Insurance Co., No. 01-02390-CM, 2002 WL 1796045 (D. Kan. 
July 31, 2002), the plaintiff in an age and gender discrimination suit sought disciplinary and 
audit information regarding not only the supervisor in question, but also other supervisors and 
employees. Id. at *3. Rejecting the defendant’s claims that the requests were overbroad and not 
limited in scope, the court stated that relevancy is established “under the amended rule if there 
is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, plaintiffs have found it easy to circumvent the 
limitations imposed by the 2000 Amendments. For example, those 
amendments did not modify Federal Rule 11(b)(3), which provides 
that, by signing a court pleading, plaintiffs’ attorneys certify that the 
pleading’s “factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”184 This 
language essentially allows plaintiffs to make unfounded allegations if 
they will likely be able to develop support for them through 
discovery. Consequently, plaintiffs need only assert strategic claims to 
broaden discovery in any way they deem advantageous. The 
discovery system established by the 2000 Amendments thus continues 
to foster discovery abuse by encouraging plaintiffs to assert 
borderline claims to expand the scope of discovery.185 
Moreover, even the 2000 Amendments’ two-tiered approach to 
the scope of discovery has been largely ineffectual in preventing 
discovery abuse by plaintiffs.186 The case law so far suggests that the 
second tier’s good-cause element is an obstacle in name only,187 such 
that plaintiffs are frequently able to convince the court that they 
should be entitled to the traditional subject-matter scope of discovery. 
 
 184. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 185. See, e.g., CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENTS—PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS: CIVIL 
RULES REGARDING DISCOVERY 90 (1998–99), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Summary_CV_Comments_1998_1999.pdf (“[This change] will . . . put 
pressure on lawyers to assert thin or borderline frivolous claims or defenses. . . . Under the 
current rules plaintiff would file a breach of contract suit and take discovery about the 
possibility of fraud. Under the amended rule, one is pushing the plaintiff’s lawyer into treading 
close to the Rule 11 line to file a fraud claim as a predicate for discovery.”). 
 186. See Christopher Frost, Note, The Sound and the Fury or the Sound of Silence?: 
Evaluating the Pre-Amendment Predictions and Post-Amendment Effects of the Discovery 
Scope-Narrowing Language in the 2000 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(1), 37 GA. L. REV. 1039, 1071 (2003) (demonstrating that a plaintiff could use the good-
cause provision to overcome a defendant’s relevancy-based challenge to an overbroad discovery 
request). 
 187. See Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 WL 503045, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2001) 
(“The minimal showings of relevance and admissibility hardly pose much of an obstacle for an 
inquiring party to overcome, even considering the recent amendment to Rule 26(b)(1).”); 
Thompson v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Md. 2001) (warning 
counsel that taking a “rigid view of the narrowed scope of discovery . . . would run counter to 
the underlying purpose of the rule changes”). In Sanyo Laser Products, Inc. v. Arista Records, 
Inc., 214 F.R.D. 496 (S.D. Ind. 2003), the court granted subject-matter discovery without a 
meaningful discussion of how the requesting party demonstrated good cause. Id. at 500–02. 
Instead, the court highlighted that the 2000 rule change, “while meaningful, [was] not dramatic, 
and broad discovery remains the norm.” Id. at 500. 
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The 2000 Amendments’ other principal change—namely, 
mandating initial disclosures—has not had any noticeable impact, 
particularly in complex cases when abuse and delay are most severe.188 
This should come as no surprise. Critics have long observed that 
mandatory disclosure requirements can lead to the “overproduction 
of marginally relevant information,” thus increasing delay and 
expenses for both sides,189 particularly at the very beginning of a case. 
Such “front-loading” of costs has the potential to “impede 
settlement.”190 
B. The 2006 Amendments 
The Federal Rules were amended again in 2006, this time to 
address the growing importance—and cost—of electronic discovery.191 
To alleviate the burdens imposed by electronic discovery, the 2006 
Amendments implemented a two-tiered proportionality approach to 
the scope of electronic discovery.192 As an initial matter, a party does 
not need to produce electronically stored information from sources 
that the party identifies as “not reasonably accessible because of 
undue burden or cost.”193 This includes, for example, electronic 
information stored on backup tapes or in offline legacy systems,194 
which can be time-consuming and expensive to restore. If a party 
wishes to obtain discovery of electronic data that are not reasonably 
accessible, the requesting party must demonstrate “good cause.”195 
 
 188. See Edward D. Cavanaugh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 886 (2008) (noting that mandatory automatic disclosure 
“never fulfilled its potential”). 
 189. E.g., Bell, supra note 3, at 41. 
 190. Michael J. Wagner, Too Much, Too Costly, Too Soon? The Automatic Disclosure 
Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 468, 477 (1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 191. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 22–28 (2005), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/FRE_Amendments/ 
2006Amendments/ST09-2005.pdf. 
 192. See Order Prescribing Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 547 U.S. 
1233, 1242 (2006) (amending Rule 26(b)(1) to create a two-tiered “proportional” discovery 
system). 
 193. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 194. Legacy systems are older computer systems not connected to an entity’s current 
computer network. 
 195. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). The Advisory Committee’s notes include several examples 
of data that are not reasonably accessible, including information stored only for disaster-
recovery purposes—for example, backup tapes—legacy data, and information that was deleted 
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The good-cause analysis incorporates a proportionality standard, 
requiring a court to “balance the costs and potential benefits of 
discovery.”196 
The 2006 Amendments also attempted to ease the burdens of 
preserving electronic information. To achieve this goal, the 
Amendments created a safe harbor provision, under which the 
destruction of electronic data through “routine, good-faith” business 
procedures—such as an email system that automatically deletes old 
emails after a certain period—cannot be sanctioned as spoliation 
unless there are “exceptional circumstances.”197 
Third, the 2006 Amendments sought to address the tremendous 
burden of reviewing unprecedented volumes of documents for 
privilege. The Amendments attempted to ease this burden by 
allowing the parties to agree beforehand that the inadvertent 
production of privileged materials does not automatically waive the 
privilege.198 
It may still be too early to gauge the effectiveness of the 2006 
Amendments,199 but, for a number of reasons, many experts believe 
these changes will prove no more successful than the 2000 
Amendments. First, the 2006 Amendments suffer from the same fatal 
flaws that undermined the 2000 Amendments—in particular the 
failure to define the term “good cause.”200 This omission leaves courts 
and practitioners alike with no useful guidance when grappling with 
whether discovery of data that are not reasonably accessible is 
appropriate.201 Moreover, a similar proportionality requirement was 
incorporated into Rule 26 in the early 1980s in a futile effort to rein in 
the abuses that had become rampant in the wake of the “photocopier 
 
and is retrievable only with forensic techniques. Id. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 
amendment. 
 196. Id. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 197. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 198. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 199. See DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 111, at 11–12 (noting the lack of studies on the 
effects of the 2006 Amendments and proposing options for further research). 
 200. Noyes, supra note 11, at 71–72. 
 201. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The 
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 905 (2009) 
(“[T]he main problem with [the 2006 Amendments] is not that they are old news. Rather, the 
problem is that such limits [referring to the 2006 Amendment’s cost-benefit proportionality 
approach] never have worked terribly well and appear unlikely to work well for e-discovery.”); 
Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 167, 181 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/82.pdf (describing the 
need to consider the “human costs” of discovery requests). 
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revolution” of the late 1960s.202 Having proven largely ineffective in 
dealing with traditional discovery issues, a proportionality 
requirement can hardly be expected to have a significant impact on 
the far larger and more complex world of electronic discovery.203 In 
reality, courts have historically ignored proportionality concerns, 
instead blaming companies for choosing to employ computer systems 
that make retrieving records more difficult or expensive.204 These 
courts reason that, having benefited from the day-to-day convenience 
of modern computer systems, companies cannot complain when they 
must incur additional expenses to meet their discovery obligations.205 
This is a Hobson’s choice, as competitive pressures leave companies 
no realistic alternative to utilizing modern computer systems. 
The 2006 Amendments also do not insulate defendants from the 
rising costs associated with electronic discovery. In fact, the 2006 
Amendments arguably worsen the problem by building additional 
costs into each case.206 In particular, the Federal Rules’ requirement 
that parties produce electronically stored information that is not 
reasonably accessible if the opposing party demonstrates good cause 
could have deleterious effects. Specifically, this rule encourages 
plaintiffs to seek broad electronic discovery from sources from which 
retrieving information will be costly, and to invent reasons why such 
information is necessary or reasonably accessible. The rules thus 
provide plaintiffs with an additional discovery mechanism to drive up 
the costs of litigation for defendants. 
Critics of the 2006 Amendments have also expressed misgivings 
about the usefulness of the safe harbor provision that protects parties 
from sanctions if they destroy electronic data through “routine, good-
faith” business procedures.207 This provision provides no guidance 
 
 202. Moss, supra note 201, at 899–900. 
 203. Id. at 905. 
 204. Id. at 900–01. 
 205. See Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
June 16, 1999) (“To permit a corporation . . . to reap the business benefits of such technology 
and simultaneously use that technology as a shield in litigation would lead to incongruous and 
unfair results.”); see also Kaufman v. Kinko’s, Inc., No. 18894-NC, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002) (“Upon installing a data storage system, it must be assumed that at 
some point in the future one may need to retrieve the information previously stored.”). 
 206. Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Litigation—Where Did It Go off Track?, LITIGATION, 
Summer 2008, at 62. 
 207. See Willoughby et al., supra note 120, at 828 (noting that only thirty federal court 
decisions have cited the safe harbor provision between its promulgation on December 1, 2006, 
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regarding what data must be preserved or the manner in which they 
must be maintained.208 Further, the circumstances under which 
sanctions may be imposed are vague and discretionary. Some experts, 
for example, posit that the safe harbor provision would not apply in 
the absence of a formal discovery order or when judges are exercising 
their inherent power to manage cases.209 In light of these 
uncertainties, companies facing even small lawsuits have little 
recourse but to continue to expend vast sums to preserve all 
potentially relevant evidence. 
These numerous shortcomings indicate that, like the 2000 
Amendments, the 2006 Amendments will not effect a radical shift in 
the case law.210 
IV.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Part IV offers five reform proposals that aim to address the root 
causes of discovery abuse in the United States, taking into account 
the lessons learned from prior discovery-reform efforts. The goal of 
these proposals is to diminish incentives for engaging in discovery 
abuse and to increase court involvement in preventing potentially 
abusive discovery. Although some of these reforms will require 
amendments to the Federal Rules, others can be implemented by 
judges immediately—and have already been adopted by some courts. 
A. Establish Clear Guidelines for Cost Shifting for  
Electronic Discovery 
The most pernicious problem with the American discovery 
system is that it incentivizes parties to seek overbroad and 
 
and January 1, 2010—and of those, only “approximately two cases per year have met its 
requirements”). 
 208. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 111, at 11. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id., supra note 111, at 11 (“[D]espite the sweeping nature of these changes 
[referring to the 2006 Amendments], even some of the most ardent proponents of the new rules 
(typically from the corporate community) argue that they do not go far enough.”); Richard L. 
Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 660 
(2006) (“[The 2006 Amendments] should contribute to the handling of this form of discovery, 
but they will hardly revolutionize it. Indeed, one strong objection to adopting several of them 
was that they don’t really add a great deal to the current rules.”); Phillips, supra note 96, at 986 
(“Despite the protective language proposed for addition to Rule 26(b)(2), the amendment 
offers electronic data identified as not reasonably accessible no greater protection from 
discovery than the current version of the Rule provides because the good cause requirement in 
the proposed amendment is not strict enough.”). 
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burdensome discovery.211 The drafters of the Federal Rules have 
already recognized this issue, but their efforts to remedy the problem 
have failed. Attorneys continue to seek large numbers of documents 
and, especially, electronic data that bear only tangentially on the 
claims or defenses at issue, simply to burden the other side and 
improve the requesting party’s prospect of a favorable settlement. 
As discussed previously, the ubiquity of modern computer 
systems—and the ever-growing caches of information they contain—
has led to a tremendous surge in the costs of electronic discovery. To 
check these rising costs and the abusive discovery tactics they have 
fostered, the Federal Rules should require courts to consider cost 
shifting whenever a party seeks electronic discovery. Such a 
requirement would place the burden of unusually large or tangential 
discovery requests on the party making the request, thereby creating 
incentives for parties to make requests that are better calculated to 
lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. 
The rules should also set forth a series of factors for courts to 
consider in deciding whether cost shifting is warranted. A good 
starting point for establishing these factors is the opinion by Judge 
Shira Scheindlin in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,212 which 
identified the following considerations: 
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover 
relevant information;  
2. The availability of such information from other sources; 
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in 
controversy; 
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available 
to each party; 
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive 
to do so; 
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.213 
 
 211. See Bruggman, supra note 137 (describing several factors that incentivize discovery 
abuse). 
 212. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 213. Id. at 322. 
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Courts could also be directed to consider the factors set forth in the 
American Bar Association’s Civil Discovery Standards.214 Adopting a 
specific standard based on these or similar factors would help courts 
make cost-shifting decisions using identifiable criteria and would go a 
long way toward addressing the shortcomings of prior efforts to curb 
discovery abuses, which relied on nebulous standards such as good 
cause for seeking burdensome discovery. 
Finally, parties requesting production of electronic documents 
that are not reasonably accessible should be required to bear the costs 
of doing so. In particular, parties seeking data from backup tapes and 
other forms of disaster-recovery215 media should be made to bear the 
costs of retrieving, reviewing, and producing this information. This 
has been the rule for some time in Texas,216 which has enjoyed 
considerable success in limiting discovery costs. Such a requirement 
would represent a significant step in reducing discovery abuse in 
connection with electronic discovery. 
 
 214. ABA SECTION OF LITIG., CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS (2004), available at http://
www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf. These factors 
include 
A. The burden and expense of the discovery, considering among other factors the 
total cost of production . . . compared to the amount in controversy; B. The need for 
the discovery, including the benefit to the requesting party and the availability of the 
information from other sources; C. The complexity of the case and the importance of 
the issues; D. The need to protect the attorney-client privilege or attorney work 
product . . . ; E. The need to protect trade secrets, proprietary, or confidential 
information; F. Whether the information or the software needed to access it is 
proprietary or constitutes confidential business information; G. The breadth of the 
discovery request; H. Whether efforts have been made to confine initial production to 
tranches or subsets of potentially responsive data; . . . J. Whether the requesting party 
has offered to pay some or all of the discovery expenses; K. The relative ability of 
each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; L. The resources of each party as 
compared to the total cost of production; M. Whether responding to the request 
would impose the burden or expense of acquiring or creating software to retrieve 
potentially responsive electronic data or otherwise require the responding party to 
render inaccessible electronic information accessible, where the responding party 
would not do so in the ordinary course of its day-to-day use of the information; . . . O. 
Whether the responding party stores electronic information in a manner that is 
designed to make discovery impracticable or needlessly costly or burdensome in 
pending or future litigation, and [is] not justified by any legitimate personal, business, 
or other non-litigation-related reasons; and P. Whether the responding party has 
deleted, discarded or erased electronic information after litigation was commenced or 
after the responding party was aware that litigation was probable . . . . 
Id. standards 29b.iv.A–P. 
 215. Disaster-recovery systems are systems designed to deal with and prevent IT downtime. 
 216. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (requiring the party who makes unreasonable discovery 
requests to pay for the discovery). 
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B. Adopt the English Rule for Discovery Disputes 
The current discovery problems can be traced in large part to the 
American rule,217 which generally requires parties to bear their own 
litigation costs, including the costs of discovery disputes. The 
American rule is perhaps the greatest single catalyst of discovery 
abuse, because it allows plaintiffs to impose tremendous costs on 
defendants at virtually no cost to themselves.218 The perverse 
incentives to which the American rule gives rise have been 
exacerbated considerably in recent years by the rising costs associated 
with electronic discovery. The American rule also encourages fishing 
expeditions because nothing dissuades plaintiffs from requesting 
virtually limitless volumes of documents and evidence. In addition, 
the American rule contributes to excessive discovery by encouraging 
parties to request information and documents from opposing parties 
rather than undertaking their own investigative efforts. 
In contrast to the American rule, the English rule requires the 
losing party to pay the winning party’s reasonable attorneys’ fees.219 
This rule, designed to dissuade meritless lawsuits, was rejected in the 
United States because of its propensity to limit access to the courts.220 
But the English rule could be adopted in the limited context of 
discovery disputes, such that the losing party in any discovery dispute 
 
 217. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting that “the 
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery 
requests”). 
 218. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New 
Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 680, 726 (1983) (“[A] 
party can have as much discovery as it wants by paying only the costs of seeking that discovery; 
the costs of compliance are generally borne without recompense by the opposing party.”). 
 219. CPR 44.3(2) (U.K.) (“If the court decides to make an order about costs . . . the general 
rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party . . . .”); 
CPR 44.4(1) (U.K.) (establishing that the court will not “allow costs which have been 
unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount”). 
 220. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way”: 
Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 887 (“No one should be too 
surprised that in a society with fairly strong emphasis on easy access to the courts, the virtually 
unique American rule, particularly its aspect that denies recovery to prevailing defendants, has 
retained fairly strong roots.”). The author articulates several negative effects of the English rule, 
including that it “may excessively discourage the pressing of plausible but not clearly winning 
claims, particularly when the prospective plaintiffs are strongly risk averse.” Id. at 888. The 
author notes that “[t]his effect is especially likely to fall heavily on middle class people with 
something to lose but not so many assets that they can tolerably afford to lose much.” Id.; see 
also Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 66 (1997) (“The demerit of 
this English rule in its application to final judgments is that it unduly chills the assertion of 
claims and defenses.”). 
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has to pay the attorneys’ fees incurred by the other side in litigating 
that particular dispute.221 This limited risk of having to pay an 
adversary’s fees is much less likely to close courthouse doors. At the 
same time, however, application of the English rule to discovery 
disputes would serve to ensure that neither party adopts an irrational 
position with regard to discovery issues. Further, the risk of having to 
pay the opposing party’s expenses for contesting a discovery request 
would help attorneys resist clients who urge them to adopt 
unreasonable positions.222 The rules should therefore be revised to 
mandate that the losing party in a discovery dispute bear the 
opposing party’s attorneys’ fees for that dispute. 
C. Define Preservation Obligations Early in the Litigation Process 
With the increasing prevalence of electronically stored 
information, data preservation has become one of the costliest aspects 
of litigation, in terms of both the expense of maintaining the physical 
media on which the data are stored and the expense of fighting 
spoliation motions. To mitigate these costs, the rules should require 
that the parties meet to discuss preservation issues as early as 
possible, even before the pretrial conference mandated by Rule 16 
and its state counterparts.223 And to ensure that preservation 
obligations are successfully defined at these early meetings, the rules 
should further mandate that the court hold an electronic-data 
conference early in the case if the parties cannot reach an agreement 
on their respective preservation obligations. Such early resolution 
would provide a significant advantage over waiting until the pretrial 
conference to address preservation issues. The parties’ preservation 
obligations begin as soon as the suit can reasonably be anticipated, 
but pretrial conferences typically do not take place until several 
months after a case has been filed. By that time, the defendant, with 
only the complaint’s broad allegations to serve as a guide, has been 
forced to guess at the extent of its preservation obligations.224 This 
 
 221. See Carrington, supra note 220, at 66 (noting that the disadvantages of the English rule 
in the broader litigation context would be an advantage in the discovery context, helping to 
discourage discovery disputes). 
 222. Id. 
 223. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., supra note 12, at 12–14. 
 224. See id. (noting that the parties’ obligation to “preserve all material that may prove 
relevant during a civil action, including electronic information. . . . is very difficult, if not 
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uncertainty puts a defendant in a bind. On the one hand, the 
defendant could err on the side of caution, preserving excessive 
numbers of documents and amounts of data. On the other hand, the 
defendant could preserve a narrower swath of information based on 
assumptions about the scope of the suit. But in doing so, the 
defendant would expose itself to possible sanctions. Defendants 
typically opt for the former approach, which produces significant 
costs and waste. Mandating early clarification of preservation 
obligations would avoid this waste. 
Moreover, the Federal Rules should make clear that parties’ 
preservation obligations do not extend to every last document or 
electronic file in their possession.225 Rather, the rules should 
emphasize that “[r]esorting to sources that are not reasonably 
accessible, while certainly possible under some circumstances, should 
be required only on a showing of good cause, with the requesting 
party bearing the burden to show good cause on a motion to compel 
or in a hearing on a protective order.”226 The rules should also provide 
that, if a party desires its opponent to preserve inaccessible forms of 
electronic data, such as backup tapes and metadata, the party must 
demonstrate a particularized need for this information.227 Finally, 
parties requesting the preservation of inaccessible data should be 
made to bear the reasonable costs of doing so. These modest changes 
would cabin the costs of document-preservation efforts and ensure 
that parties do not make outlandish demands for document 
preservation simply as a tool to oppress their opponents in litigation. 
 
impossible . . . in an environment in which litigants maintain enormous stores of electronic 
records”). 
 225. In fact, a number of district courts have adopted local rules requiring the parties to 
discuss preservation issues. See, e.g., Default Standard for Discovery of Electronic Documents 
(“E-Discovery”), DIST. OF DEL., U.S. DIST. COURT, http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/Announce/
HotPage21.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (establishing default standards for discovery of 
electronic documents when parties were unable to proceed on a consensual basis). 
 226. SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., 
supra note 118, at 45. 
 227. The Federal Rules make clear that a party can move for a protective order to clarify its 
preservation obligations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“On motion to compel discovery or 
for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information 
is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”). My proposal would shift the 
burden to the requesting party to demonstrate a need for preserving otherwise inaccessible data, 
rather than requiring parties to preserve all potentially relevant information unless and until 
they can convince the court that the cost and burden of doing so are unwarranted. 
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D. Limit Sanctions for Failure to Preserve Electronic Documents 
Only to Cases of Intentional Destruction or Recklessness 
The task of preserving electronic information is fraught with 
pitfalls, even for the wary.228 As noted previously, electronic 
information by its very nature is ephemeral, and it is routinely altered 
and deleted in the normal course of a company’s operations. The ease 
with which it is created, transmitted, and stored also makes it difficult 
for companies to locate all electronic data that may require 
preservation. Indeed, given the large volumes of computer records 
that now exist in some companies, it may be virtually impossible to 
preserve all potentially relevant electronic data.229 For these reasons, 
sanctions for spoliation should be imposed only when a party has 
intentionally destroyed evidence or has been demonstrably reckless in 
failing to preserve it. 
The 2006 Amendments attempted to address this problem by 
creating a safe harbor for electronic-document preservation. Under 
new Rule 37(e), “absent exceptional circumstances,” courts may not 
impose sanctions “on a party” if electronic documents are lost “as a 
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system.”230 Although well-intentioned, this rule fails to 
 
 228. As the Managing Director of the Sedona Conference noted in a recent article, 
[E]lectronically stored information can easily be rendered inaccessible though 
negligence, unfamiliarity of custodians with computer technology, or routine 
operations of computers and networks. The simple act of opening a file on a 
computer changes the information in the “date last accessed” field of that file’s 
metadata, creates or overwrites various system files, and may change substantive 
information in the file itself. Computers are configured to run routine maintenance 
and “clean up” functions that will change or overwrite electronically stored 
information. Networks are configured to eliminate files that have not been accessed 
for a reasonable period of time, or automatically delete the oldest emails in a user’s 
email box. Disaster recovery backup tapes regularly create electronically stored 
information by copying it from the computer hard drives, and regularly are recycled, 
thus destroying that information. Halting these routine operations in response to a 
“legal hold” may be difficult, impossible, unduly costly or unduly burdensome. 
Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 189 (2006). 
 229. For example, in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), an 
unfair trade practices case, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
Lanham Act claims based on the plaintiff’s failure to produce a database maintained by a 
nonparty contractor. Id. at 736–37. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court’s order compelling 
production would have resulted in substantial difficulties, such as purchasing a mainframe 
computer or paying the contractor close to $30 million for an archive of the database. Id. at 739. 
The circuit court held that given these circumstances, the plaintiff’s duties were unclear 
regarding the preservation and production of the nonparty’s database, and the violation of the 
order was not willful. Id. at 739–40. 
 230. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
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provide adequate protection for a variety of reasons. First, it does not 
account for the possibility that even the most careful attempts to 
locate and preserve electronic data may not succeed in preserving all 
potentially relevant information. For example, if a party deletes 
electronic data in good faith but not as part of routine operations, 
Rule 37(e) would not protect it. Second, the phrase “routine, good-
faith operation of an electronic information system” is too vague to 
provide clear guidance as to a party’s preservation obligations. It is 
unclear whether sanctions would be available against a party that fails 
to suspend a deleting or overwriting program that routinely rids the 
company’s information system of data that are not reasonably 
accessible. Third, the rule fails to explain what exceptional 
circumstances might warrant the imposition of sanctions even when 
data are lost through the routine, good-faith operation of a computer 
system. Finally, the rule applies only to parties, and thus provides no 
protection to nonparties, who play an increasingly important role in 
litigation. Federal and state rules should adopt the approach recently 
implemented by California, in which a safe harbor is provided not 
only for destroyed evidence but also for evidence that has been “lost, 
damaged, altered or overwritten” in good faith.231 Although there is a 
dearth of commentary concerning California’s safe harbor provision, 
which was signed into law in June 2009, the new rule reflects a fair 
balance between the need for information and the costs of civil 
discovery. 
Finally, the rules should require courts to consider the degree of 
prejudice resulting from a party’s failure to preserve the electronic 
data in determining whether sanctions are warranted. This factor 
should also inform a court’s decisionmaking when it determines the 
severity of a sanction.232 Requiring a showing of prejudice will limit 
the parties’ ability to exploit spoliation traps, such as discovery 
requests crafted simply to expose perceived imperfections in 
preservation efforts as a basis for sanctions or other forms of 
 
 231. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1985.8(l)(1) (West 2009). Unlike the federal rule, the 
California safe harbor provision is not limited to parties. See id. (“Absent exceptional 
circumstances, the court shall not impose sanctions on a subpoenaed person or any attorney of a 
subpoenaed person for failure to provide electronically stored information that has been lost, 
damaged, altered, or overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an 
electronic information system.”). 
 232. See Withers, supra note 228, at 207–08 (noting that historically “the degree of prejudice 
to the requesting party’s case due to the non-producing party’s loss of the data” was “an 
important element in the judge’s analysis”). 
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litigation leverage that have no legitimate connection to the merits of 
a case. If a party cannot articulate any plausible prejudice, sanctions 
have no real compensatory or deterrent purpose, particularly in the 
case of inadvertent preservation failures. 
E. Suspend Discovery During the Pendency of a Motion to Dismiss 
Another critical reform is to stay all fact discovery during the 
pendency of any motions to dismiss. Such a rule already applies to 
securities class actions under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA),233 which codified a number of substantive and 
procedural provisions “designed to prevent abuses of federal 
securities class action lawsuits.”234 In passing the PSLRA, Congress 
sought to curtail the extensive discovery requests that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys used to secure quick settlements and to launch fishing 
expeditions before a court had even determined that the plaintiff’s 
legal claims were viable.235 Recognizing that “[t]he cost of discovery 
often forces innocent parties to settle frivolous securities class 
actions,”236 Congress imposed an automatic stay on discovery during 
the pendency of a motion to dismiss in private securities cases.237 
This small but significant change has proven extremely effective 
in reining in vexatious lawsuits. “[D]efendants [in securities fraud 
class actions] are now extremely reluctant to settle before a motion to 
 
 233. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 234. Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative 
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1023 
(1998). 
 235. At congressional hearings debating the PSLRA, 
reform proponents alleged that nearly every stock price decline greater than 10% 
resulted in a strike suit. . . . [Public accounting firms] contended that “entrepreneurial 
lawyers” would find a publicly traded company with a red flag financial issue, such as 
a 10% drop in stock value, and name the auditing firm to the lawsuit for their ‘deep 
pockets,’ rather than blameworthiness. Lead plaintiff’s counsel would then make 
voluminous discovery requests that were so expensive to comply with that it made 
sense economically to settle the lawsuit rather than protract litigation. 
Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Private 
Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 421–23 
(2005) (footnotes omitted). 
 236. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 237. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (automatically staying discovery except when the 
judge finds it necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to a party); see also 
Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of Action Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 621, 635 (2006) (noting that the purpose of the 
mandatory stay provision is “to reduce the costs of meritless actions”). 
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dismiss has been decided.”238 Because judges must now evaluate the 
merits of a securities class-action suit before subjecting a defendant to 
expensive civil discovery, there is little incentive for plaintiffs to file 
“frivolous claims.”239 
In light of this success, Congress and state legislatures should 
establish a similar requirement in all civil cases. Under the current 
system, even an entirely frivolous lawsuit can compel a defendant to 
expend millions of dollars collecting, reviewing, producing, and 
preserving records. Given the exponential rise in electronic discovery 
costs, this possibility exerts enormous pressure on defendants to settle 
cases quickly. An automatic stay would greatly reduce the in terrorem 
value of lawsuits and would ensure that lawsuits “stand or fall based 
on the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs rather than information 
produced by the defendants after the action has been filed.”240 Such a 
stay would also be consonant with the Supreme Court’s recent 
observations in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly241 about the important 
role of motions to dismiss in limiting the potentially enormous costs 
of discovery.242 
A number of federal courts have already adopted this approach, 
recognizing that because the very purpose of a motion to dismiss is to 
decide whether a complaint has enough merit to open discovery, it 
makes no sense to launch discovery before that threshold decision has 
been made.243 As one court put it: if the parties begin discovery and a 
 
 238. Richard H. Walker, David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The New Securities Class 
Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 665 (1997). 
 239. See Dae Hwan Chung, Introduction to South Korea’s New Securities-Related Class 
Action, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 165, 177 (2004) (noting that the PSLRA “stay provision has had a 
great effect on curbing frivolous claims”); see also Walter C. Somol, Dredging the Safe Harbor 
for Forward-Looking Statements—An Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s 
Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 265, 297–98 (1998) 
(explaining that one of the “positive effects” of the PSLRA is that “companies . . . resist filing 
meritless claims”). 
 240. S.G. Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 189 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Medhekar v. U.S. Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 241. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 242. Id. at 558–59 (noting that the defendants faced the prospect of having to produce 
“reams and gigabytes of business records” in the event that the motion to dismiss was denied). 
 243. See Tostado v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. SA-09-CV-549-XR, 2009 WL 4774771, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2009) (granting the defendant’s motion to stay discovery pending 
adjudication of a motion to dismiss); West v. Johnson, No. C08-5741RJB, 2009 WL 2163565, at 
*1 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2009) (“A short stay of discovery is appropriate until a decision can be 
made on the various Defendants’ motions to dismiss . . . .”); Allmond v. City of Jacksonville, 
No. 3:07-cv-1139-J-33TEM, 2008 WL 2704426, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2008) (granting a motion 
to stay discovery pending a ruling on a motion to dismiss because “upon cursory glance of 
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court ultimately grants a defendant’s motion to dismiss, then the 
initial discovery “would constitute needless expense and a waste 
of . . . time and energy.”244 
CONCLUSION 
Discovery abuse continues to be a serious problem in the 
American civil justice system and is rapidly growing more pernicious. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel continue to rely on the same calculus: in other 
words, the time and expense defendants must devote to responding to 
voluminous discovery requests will make settlement more attractive. 
Burdensome discovery requests force defendants to devote 
considerable resources to identifying, collecting, and copying 
documents. Such requests also impose hefty legal fees because all 
documents must be reviewed by counsel prior to production to ensure 
that they do not contain privileged material. Plaintiffs can also impose 
substantial costs by seeking to depose the defendant’s key employees. 
The time needed to prepare for, travel to, and participate in such 
depositions can distract these employees from their normal duties for 
extended periods.245 Broadly worded interrogatories also sidetrack the 
defendant’s employees, forcing them to spend considerable time 
gathering information and conveying it to their attorneys. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys also continue to engage in unwarranted and 
ultimately useless fishing expeditions. Broad document requests and 
numerous depositions seeking mostly irrelevant information impose 
significant costs on defendants because employees must spend time 
searching for responsive documents and responding to interrogatories 
 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss the resolution of the motions could dispose of the entire case”); 
Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., No. 05-4294 DRH ETB, 2006 WL 897996, at 
*1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (granting the defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending 
resolution of a motion to dismiss when defendants “raise[d] substantial issues with regard to the 
viability of plaintiffs’ complaint”); Howse v. Atkinson, No. 04-2341 GTV DJW, 2005 WL 
994572, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2005) (granting a motion to stay discovery pending a ruling on 
a motion to dismiss raising issues related to immunity defenses); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
563 n.8 (recognizing that courts must carefully scrutinize motions to dismiss because “before 
proceeding to discovery, a complaint must allege facts suggestive of illegal conduct”).  
 244. Thompson v. Ret. Plan for Emps. of S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., No. 07-CV-1047, 2008 
WL 4964714, at *10 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 14, 2008). 
 245. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 268 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting the high costs of discovery and discovery-related abuse); see also TASK 
FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS 
AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 6–7 (1989) (estimating that 60 percent of litigation costs in 
federal cases can be attributed to discovery and abuse of the discovery process); Willging et al., 
supra note 5, at 530–31, 540, 547–50 tbls.3, 4 & 5 (detailing the costs of discovery). 
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seeking information of little, if any, relevance.246 Even the Supreme 
Court has recognized the deleterious effects of fishing expeditions, 
denouncing them as “a social cost, rather than a benefit.”247 And the 
noxious effects of fishing expeditions are not limited to needless and 
excessive costs. Plaintiffs’ attorneys also use fishing expeditions to 
uncover embarrassing information about the defendant or its 
employees, or to force a competitor to divulge trade secrets or other 
proprietary information.248 
The tactical jockeying that is now commonplace during discovery 
has also given rise to more subtle forms of harassment. As one 
plaintiffs’ attorney boasted, “‘a nice way to tie up the other side’ is to 
secure a protective order which limits the number of [the defendant’s 
employees] with whom opposing counsel can share information and 
discuss the case.” The attorney went on to explain that these 
protective orders “can impair an attorney’s capacity to prepare for 
trial and can force him to spend time and money trying to justify a 
modification” to the order.249 Such efforts to game the system serve no 
legitimate purpose. 
Discovery abuses have profoundly negative consequences for 
American courts and, ultimately, the American economy. Justice is 
denied as defendants deem litigation too expensive to pursue. Cases 
languish as parties work to collect and review previously 
unimaginable volumes of documents. Judges are distracted from 
substantive matters to referee increasingly acrimonious discovery 
disputes. Consumers are harmed as the costs of companies’ increased 
litigation exposure are passed on to them in the form of higher prices. 
The uncertainty and cost associated with frivolous lawsuits dissuade 
foreign companies from doing business in America, depriving the 
U.S. economy of a much-needed source of jobs and investment. 
 
 246. See Janet Novack, Control/Alt/Discover, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1997, at 60, 60 (“[T]he more 
common problem is that companies are having to spend long hours and big dollars culling and 
retrieving data . . . .”). 
 247. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975). 
 248. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines, supra note 73, at 236 (“[Attorneys would] demand[] 
that an opponent produce his income tax returns to capitalize on fears that disclosure of income 
could lead to difficulties with the government or a spouse, explor[e] politically sensitive subjects 
in suits against public agencies or officials to capitalize on fears of political repercussions, 
inquir[e] into the dating habits of a separated spouse or threaten[] to depose the third member 
of a relationship whose triangularity would best be kept secret, and focus[] discovery probes on 
arguably illegal and clearly embarrassing corporate ‘contributions’ to foreign governments or 
officials.”). 
 249. Id. at 232 n.27. 
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Because the situation is deteriorating rapidly, an immediate and 
comprehensive response is necessary. Ultimately, our courts need to 
adopt new procedural rules that will allow parties to litigate matters 
in a timely and cost-efficient manner. In the meantime, however, even 
modest measures—such as more standardized case-management 
orders and increased, early attention to discovery issues by judges and 
magistrates—could significantly alleviate discovery abuse. In 
addition, courts must be given additional resources to manage cases, 
particularly the larger, more complex cases that are most susceptible 
to abuse. Although those changes would not completely resolve the 
issues present in the civil discovery process, they would provide a 
substantial improvement and a foundation for further reforms. 
